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TAKING TEXT TOO SERIOUSLY:
MODERN TEXTUALISM, ORIGINAL
MEANING, AND THE CASE OF AMAR'S
BILL OF RIGHTS
William Michael Treanor*
Championed on the Supreme Court by Justice Scalia and Justice Thomas
and in academia most prominently by Professor Akhil Amar, textualism has
emerged within the past twenty years as a leading school of constitutional
interpretation. Textualists argue that the Constitution should be interpreted
in accordance with its original public meaning, and in seeking that meaning, they closely parse the Constitution's words and grammar and the
placement of clauses in the document. They have assumed that this close
parsing recaptures original meaning, but, perhaps because it seems obviously correct, that assumption has neither been defended nor challenged.
This Article uses Professor Amar's widely acclaimed masterpiece of the
textualist movement, The Bill of Rights, as a case study to test the validity
of that assumption.
Amar's work has profoundly influenced subsequent scholarship and case
law with its argument that the creation of the Bill of Rights primarily reflected republican rights of "the people" rather than individual rights.
This Article shows that Amar's republican reading is incorrect and that his
textualist interpretive approach repeatedly leads him astray. Amar incorrectly assumes that words have the same meaning throughout the
document, assigns a significance to the placement of clauses that is belied
by the drafting history, and incorrectly posits that the Bill of Rights reflects
a unitary ideological vision. The textualist search for original public
meaning cannot be squared with an interpretive approach that assumes
that all word choices were made with a high degree of care, that the significance of location can be assessed simply by examining the four comers
of the document, and that the Constitution must be understood holistically.
Analysis of Professor Amar's Bill of Rights indicates that, paradoxically,
close reading is a poor guide to original meaning: rather, careful study of
the drafting history is necessary to recapture any such understanding.
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Zipursky for their helpful comments and suggestions. I am also grateful to Kate McLeod and the
other members of the staff of the Fordham Law Library for invaluable research support.
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INTRODUCTION

In less than twenty years, textualism 1 has moved from the periphery of
constitutional discourse to a position of the greatest prominence. Two justices of the Supreme Court, Antonin Scalia and Clarence Thomas, champion
this interpretive approach, as do a cadre of influential academics, Akhil
Amar most prominently among them. Constitutional textualists share a view
that the Constitution should be read to reflect the original meaning of its
text. They also share an assumption that they have not defended-that the
original meaning of the text is determined by reading the document closely.
In uncovering constitutional meaning, textualists stress precise word choice,
placement of text in the document, and grammar: they compare related parts
of the constitutional document and accord weight to subtle similarities and
differences. They interpret the Constitution using the same close textual
analysis more often associated with literary critics explicating poetry. 2

I. Although usage among acaclemics is inconsistent, in this Article textualism refers to the
school of thought that interprets the Constitution in accordance with the text's original meaning for
the public at the time of its adoption. Many leading textualists embrace this approach. See RoBERT
H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA 144 (1990) ("The search is not for subjective intention ....
[W]hat counts is what the public understood."); Akhil Reed Amar, The Supreme Court: /999 Term,
Foreword: The Document and the Doctrine, 114 HARV. L. REV. 26, 29 (2000) ("What counts as text
is the document as understood by the American People who ratified and amended it, and what
counts as history is accessible public meaning, not secret private intent."); Steven G. Calabresi &
Saikrishna B. Prakash, The President's Power to Execute the Laws, 104 YALE L.J. 541, 548 n.22
(1994). Others seek to interpret the Constitution in accord with "original intent"-the intent of the
framers of constitutional text. A third approach seeks to interpret the Constitution in accordance
with the "original understanding" of the ratifiers. I use the word originalism to refer collectively to
the latter two approaches (original intent and original understanding). For further discussion, see
infra Part I.
2. For the classic work of New Criticism, the literary movement associated with such close
reading, see WILLIAM K. WIMSATT, JR., THE VERBAL ICON: STUDIES IN THE MEANING OF POETRY
(1954).

December 2007)

Taking Text too Seriously

489

There is an obvious appeal to this approach. When textualists offer an
interpretation that draws on an apparently close reading-when they see
patterns previously unseen or construct a reading that appears illuminating-it would seem that they are on to something. It is like a puzzle: if all
the pieces fit, then the puzzle has been solved. And who would argue that
text should not be read closely? Yet a close reading may not reflect original
meaning. It may instead reflect the creativity of the interpreter or the way a
text is read today.
Here is an example: Justice Thomas, Professor Amar, and others have
assigned critical interpretive weight to the fact that, "[i]n the Constitution,
after all, 'the United States' is consistently a plural noun." 3 This grammar
would appear to suggest that the Constitution reflects the view that the
United States is a collection of states rather than one nation. What this reading misses, however, is the fact that in the late eighteenth century, nouns
ending in the letter s were commonly assigned plural verbs, regardless of
whether or not the noun itself was plural. This rule was gradually displaced
as the nineteenth century progressed. 4 It is true that "United States" was often matched with a plural verb in 1787 and consistently matched with a
singular verb after the Civil War. But one cannot conclude simply from this
change in grammatical practice that the dominant political theory

3. U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 846 n.l (Thomas, J., dissenting). See
also AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA'S CoNSTITUTION: A BIOGRAPHY 29 (2005). Amar notes as follows:
Thus, the text of the Constitution did not say, and the act of constitution did not do, something
like the following: "Because the United States is [sic] already one sovereign and indivisible
nation, the ratification of nine states shall suffice to establish this Constitution in all thirteen
States."

/d. The "[sic]" is from Professor Amar's book. For other examples of writers assigning significance
to the fact that the "United States" takes a plural verb in the Constitution, see FoRREST McDoNALD,
STATES' RIGHTS AND THE UNION: IMPERIUM IN IMPERIO, 1776-1876, at 20-22 (2000); Jay S.
Bybee, Common Ground: Roben Jackson, Antonin Scalia, and a Power Theory of the First Amendment, 75 TuL. L. REv. 251, 324 n.445 (2000); and Robert F. Nagel. Real Revolution, 13 GA. ST. U.
L. REv. 985, 994 n.34 (1997). While Professor Amar and Justice Thomas both accord weight to the
verb choice, they understand its significance differently. Justice Thomas contends that "the people of
each State retained their separate political identities." U.S. Term Limits, 514 U.S. at 849 (Thomas, J.,
dissenting). Professor Amar contends instead that ratification of the Constitution ended each state's
sovereign status. AMAR, supra, at 33.
It should be noted that earlier in his career, Amar had taken a somewhat different approach,
noting that "United States" takes a plural verb in the Constitution but, in light of other textual evidence, simply dismissing the significance of the grammar:
Indeed, the Constitution's consistent use of the phrase "the United States" as a plural noun only
serves to cast further doubt on the self-evident correctness of the conventional reading of the
Preamble's opening phrase. However, a closer look at the rest of the Constitution reveals several other provisions that can help the Preamble's overworked opening words bear the
argumentative load.
Akhil Reed Amar, Of Sovereignty and Federalism, 96 YALE L.J. 1425, 1455 (1987) (footnote omitted).
4. See STERLING ANDRUS LEONARD, THE DocTRINE OF CORRECTNESS IN ENGLISH USAGE,
1700-1800, at 221 (1962).
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changed-the same verb shift occurred for the word news, 5 and there was no
reconceptualization of news. Grammar offers a full explanation for the
6
grammar.
As this example indicates, close readings of the text do not always capture original meaning. The close reading advanced by textualists with
respect to the meaning of the "United States" in the original Constitution
reflects the erroneous premise that a modem rule regarding plural verbs was
also the rule in effect in the late eighteenth century. This example illustrates
a larger point: textualists have simply assumed that close readings reliably
capture original meaning. Critics of textualism have not questioned that assumption. This Article challenges the equation of a modem (and a
historical) close reading with the actual original public meaning of the text,
and instead it argues for the critical importance of evidence such as drafting
and ratifying history-evidence many textualists minimize or ignore-as a
guide.
In a recent article on the origins of judicial review, I looked at early
cases involving constitutional challenges of statutes. I found that these opinions reflect an approach to interpretation that is, at its core, structural, not
textualist. When engaged in constitutional interpretation, as a general matter, early judges did not closely parse text. Instead, their approach reflected
a concern with the larger purposes underlying the text. 7
Rather than studying judicial opinions, this Article approaches the problem of the relationship between modern textualism and original meaning
from a different angle, using a case study to show the dramatic gap between
textualist readings and original meaning. The case study is Professor Amar's
book The Bill of Rights. 8
Amar's book has had a broad influence on scholarly debate and case law
as the leading academic work championing a republican, group-rights
(rather than a liberal, individual-rights) reading of the Bill of Rights. This
5. See 10 OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 374 (2d ed. 1989) (providing usages of the word
news). The last example of the word news taking a plural verb is a usage by Shelley in 1821./d.
6. My point here is not that the founders thought of the United States as a single sovereign
but rather that the usage of a plural verb in conjunction with "United States" in the Constitution
does not prove one way or the other what the founders' political theory was. Both MartinS. Flaherty
and Henry Paul Monaghan offer further discussion of the founders' theory on sovereignty. Martin S.
Flaherty, John Marshall, McCulloch v. Maryland, and "We the People": Revisions in Need of Revising, 43 WM. & MARY L. REv. 1339 (2002) (analyzing competing schools of thought); Henry Paul
Monaghan, We the People[sf, Original Understanding, and Constitutional Amendmem, 96 CoLUM.
L. REv. 121, 138 (1996). Monaghan notes as follows:
To my eyes, neither completely state-centered nor completely nationalist views of the
founding capture the original understanding .... A significant number of Americans simultaneously held-in varying mixtures and intensities-some concept of a "We the People" of the
United States and (more importantly for my argument) some concept of a "We the People" of
Delaware, and so on.
Monaghan, supra, at 138.
7. William Michael Treanor, Judicial Review Before Marbury, 58 STAN. L. REv. 455 (2005).
For further discussion of what the conclusions in my earlier article suggest about the founding generation's interpretive approach, see infra Part I.
8.

AKHIL REEDAMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: CREATION AND RECONSTRUCTION (1998).
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Article shows why his argument is dramatically misconceived. My primary
concern here, however, is on textualism, and I have chosen to focus on Amar
and his book for several reasons.
First, Amar has written more extensively on textualism and has worked
out its methodology and implications far more fully than anyone else, including Justice Scalia. His Harvard Law Review Foreword The Document
and the Doctrine9 and his article Intratextualism 10 develop his approach and
discuss the various textualist techniques he applies. In The Bill of Rights he
brings those techniques to bear in an extended, textualist study of the Bill of
Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment. In applying his textualist approach,
Amar evidences a trait shared by many leading practitioners of textualism:
while not wholly ignoring drafting history and textual usages outside the
constitutional document, he relegates these evidentiary sources to secondary
importance. His central focus is on the text, and it is assumed that close
reading yields original meaning.
Second, while Amar is politically liberal, his textualism has been enthusiastically and repeatedly embraced by leading conservatives as the
preeminent embodiment of proper textualist methodology. Michael Paulsen
has proclaimed Amar's America's Constitution 11 the finest book about the
Constitution since the Federalist Papers. 12 The Bill of Rights and the articles
from which it was derived have been repeatedly cited by Justice Thomas and
Justice Scalia,n and leading textualist Gary Lawson has called The Bill of
Rights "one of the best law books of the twentieth century." 14 Stephen
Calabresi, another leading textualist, has declared The Bill of Rights to be
"one of the most valuable works of constitutional scholarship written in the
modern era." 15 He adds that "Professor Amar has now indubitably proven
that we can reconstruct original meanings with a very high degree of

9.

Amar, supm note I.

10. Akhil Reed Amar, lntmtextualism, 112 HARV. L. REv. 747 (1999) [hereinafter Amar,
lntratextualism ]; see also Akhil Reed Amar, America's Constitution and the Yale School of Constitutional Interpretation, 115 YALE L.J. 1997 (2006) [hereinafter Amar, Yale School].
II.

AMAR. supra note 3.

12. Michael Stokes Paulsen, How To Interpret the Constitution (and How Not To), 115 YALE
L.J. 2037, 2038 (2006).
13. See, e.g., Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow. 542 U.S. I, 50 (2004) (Thomas, J.,
concurring); Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 679 (2002) (Thomas, J., concurring); Printz
v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 939 (1997) (Thomas, J., concurring); California v. Acevedo, 500
U.S. 565, 581 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring); see also Akhil Reed Amar, An Open Letter to Pmfes.mrs Paulsen and Powell, 115 YALE L.J. 2101, 2109 n.24 (2006) (describing Professor Amar's
influence on Supreme Court jurisprudence).
14. Gary Lawson, The Bill of Rights as an Exclamation Point, 33 U. RICH. L. REv. 511, 511
( 1999) (reviewing AMAR, supra note 8).
15. Stephen G. Calabresi, We Are All Federalists, We Are All Republicans: Holism, Synthesis,
and the Fourteenth Amendment, 87 GEO. L.J. 2273,2274 (1999) (reviewing AMAR, supra note 8).
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accuracy." 16 As the preeminent textualist scholar, Amar is an appropriate
representative of the methodology. 17
Third, if the panoply of close-reading techniques that Amar and other
textualists champion and employ ever tracks original meaning, the Bill of
Rights is precisely where one would expect that tracking to occur. While
Amar, in what is essentially a companion volume to his book on the Bill of
Rights, has written a textualist interpretation of the entire Constitution, 18 his
view that constitutional provisions are each "part of a single coherent Constitution"19 and that they are reflective of a "deep design" 20 does not easily fit
with the reality of the framing. The series of compromises between sharply
divided factions at the Constitutional Convention and a textual finish by
Gouverneur Morris produced many of the constitutional features that textualists highlight. But members of the Convention often dispensed with them
after little, if any, significant discussion. 21 And the adoption of subsequent
amendments makes it more difficult to see the Constitution as a text to be
understood as one piece. In contrast, the Bill of Rights avoids these problems. It is a significant body of text, permitting links to be explored without
considering other parts of the Constitution. It was also produced at one time
and in large part written by one person. This avoids reading too much into
similarities in language written at different times or that was the result of
political compromises. The Bill of Rights is the part of the Constitution for
which the close reading of Amar and other modern textualists would seem
most likely to accord with original meaning.
Finally, Amar is a constitutional scholar of remarkable intelligence and
interpretive skill. He is not simply the leading textualist scholar: he is one of
the most creative, insightful, and influential constitutional law scholars of
the modern era.
In sum, in choosing this author and this book as a test case, I have very
consciously chosen both textualism's preeminent academic advocate and the
case in which strong claims for close reading would appear most plausible.
The textualist approach that Professor Amar employs, however, does not

16.

/d. at 2275.

17.

The fact that leading textualists have embraced Amar's historical account does not mean
that it has won universal acceptance. Perhaps the most sustained challenge has come from Professor
Henry Monaghan. Professor Monaghan's article We the People[s], Original Understanding, and
Constitutional Amendment argues at length that Professor Amar's contention "that despite Article V,
the Framers intended that a simple majority of a national 'We the People' could amend the Constitution" is "historically groundless." Monaghan, supra note 6, at 121. Monaghan's challenges are
aimed at two of Amar's articles: Akhil Reed Amar, The Consent of the Governed: Constitutional
AmendmeIll Outside Article V, 94 CoLUM. L. REv. 457 (1994 ); and Akhil Reed Amar, Philadelphia
Revisited: Amending the Constitution Outside Article V, 55 U. CHI. L. REv. 1043 (1988).
18.

AMAR, supra note 3.

19.

Amar, lntratextualism, supra note 10, at 822.

20.

/d. at 814.

21.

See infra Section I. B.
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allow us to "reconstruct original meanings with a very high degree of accuracy,"22 to put it mildly.
Part I of this Article discusses textualism's rise as a response to the
power of the scholarly critique of originalism and Professor Amar's leading
role in the academy as an expositor and practitioner of textualism. It sets
forth the canons of interpretation he has articulated-his focus on placement, unified ideological vision, and textual linkages among parts of the
document-and the republican reading of the Bill of Rights that he uses
textualism to defend.
Part II then examines one of Professor Amar's central claims to illustrate
how his textualism leads him far from the original meaning he seeks to recover. Amar argues that the Ninth Amendment is primarily concerned, not
with the protection of individual rights, but rather with the people's right to
alter or abolish government. In advancing this view, he stresses locationand in particular the fact that the Ninth and Tenth Amendments are next to
each other and should thus be read together. He also relies on a close reading of the text: the Amendment protects "rights ... retained by the people,"23
and he argues that the words "the people" have a "conspicuously collective
meaning." 24 I show, however, that the Ninth and Tenth Amendments are next
to each other by purest happenstance. They were originally parts of
Madison's proposed Fourth and Eighth Amendments, respectively. They
were meant to be inserted into the constitutional text rather than appended at
the end, and they ultimately came together because of a series of decisions
that had nothing to do with any sense that they were a unit. Similarly, examining the history of the Constitution's ratification and the Ninth
Amendment's drafting shows that, at the time of the Bill of Rights, the
phrase "rights [of] the people" was not conspicuously collective but instead
encompassed individual rights at least as much as collective rights.
Part III shows how Amar's misreading of the Ninth Amendment exemplifies the fundamental problems that undermine his analysis of the Bill of
Rights and, more basically, his claim that his textualism reveals original
meaning. Specifically, it examines the three critical premises of his interpretive approach: ( 1) that through the repetition of words and phrases,
constitutional clauses gloss each other and reveal underlying meaning;
(2) that the location of clauses in the Constitution reveals meaning; and
(3) that the document must be understood as a coherent whole. Each tenet is
deeply flawed: ( 1) a focus on the way words are used in the document overlooks other, equally relevant evidence concerning meaning; (2) the location
of clauses is of very limited significance, and that significance cannot be
determined without close consideration of drafting history; (3) and the Constitution does not reflect a consistent underlying ideology.

22.

Calabresi, supra note 15, at 2275.

23.

U.S. CoNST. amend. IX.

24.

AMAR,

supra note 8, at 120.
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This Article is a work of history, not of constitutional theory. My concern here is not to argue that close-reading textualism should be rejected as
a matter of constitutional theory. Modern textualists embrace an approach
that, at its core, involves interpretation of a popularly enacted document (the
Constitution) using a methodology that reflects neutral principles (the principles of close-reading textualism) rather than the constitutional ideology of
the interpreter. It thus has two theoretical justifications. First, it constrains
judges from deciding cases in accordance with their own values by giving
them interpretive principles to apply. 25 One can question how true this is.
Given that Professor Amar, its leading academic proponent, is a liberal and
that Justice Scalia, its leading judicial practitioner, is a conservative, it
would appear that close-reading textualism is not terribly constraining.
Nonetheless, I am not concerned with rebutting the argument that closereading textualism is an attractive interpretive approach because it strongly
anchors judicial decision making.
My concern is with the historical underpinning of the second justification of textualism: that it has a majoritarian basis because it recaptures the
meaning that the document had when adopted. 26 Using Amar's Bill of Rights
as a case study, this Article argues that close-reading textualism is a deeply
flawed guide to original meaning because the assumptions a reader such as
Amar brings to bear in interpreting a text are not those of the founding generation. While Amar's account reflects a significant number of mistakes
concerning the historical record, the critical problem with his approach is
caused not by those errors but by his underlying assumption that careful
reading of the text consistently reveals original meaning. To recover drafters' and ratifiers' intent, originalists look carefully at drafting and ratifying
debates and background usages of constitutional terms. Although Amar examines these materials, he does not do so rigorously because he is primarily
concerned with text. But close attention to historical sources is necessary to
recapture the text's original meaning.
Amar writes: "Textualism presupposes that the specific constitutional
words ultimately enacted were generally chosen with care. Otherwise, why
bother reading closely?"27 But while the Constitution and Bill of Rights
were the product of extensive deliberation, they were not written with either
the extraordinary concern for word choice and placement or the common
vision that Amar posits. The founders were not writing a poem, and the interpretive assumptions a modern reader makes in closely reading the text
can lead her dramatically astray from original meaning.

25. ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION 44-47 (1997); Amar, supra note I, at
53-54; A mar, lntratextualism, supra note I 0, at 798; Antonin Scalia. Originalism: The Lesser Evil.
57 U. CIN. L. REV. 849, 857 (1989); see also RALPH A. RosSUM, ANTONIN SCALIA's JURISPRUDENCE 27 (2006).
26. Amar, supra note I, at 27-37; Amar, lntratextualism, supra note 10, at 748-55; see also
SCALIA, supra note 25, at 37-41.
27.

Amar, supra note I, at 29.
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HOLISTIC l'EXTUALISM, AND THE SEARCH FOR
ORIGINAL MEANING

Textualism's prominence in constitutional law is a recent phenomenon:
in the late 1980s, for instance, legal commentators observed that direct reliance on text played comparatively little role in constitutional adjudication. 28
The rise of textualism reflects several factors.
It was, in part, a reaction to the perception that Warren and Burger Court
decisions reflected the justices' personal values and thus were unconstrained
by principle or majoritarian sanction. 29 Because the basic premise of textualism is that judges should decide cases by construing a popularly adopted
text on the basis of what that text meant at the time it was adopted, textualism responded to concerns about constraining judges and providing
majoritarian legitimacy. Thus, Justice Scalia observed, "the text of the Constitution, and our traditions, say what they say and there is no fiddling with
them." 3° Champions of textualism argue that textualism is appropriate because it gives judges a set of rules that were adopted by the people and that
the people have never changed. 31
Textualism's rise to prominence is also due to the power of academic attacks on originalism. Textualism and originalism are closely allied schools of
interpretation. Justice Scalia described himself as an originalist in an article he
wrote in 1989. 32 However, in A Matter of Interpretation, his most recent
scholarly work on constitutional interpretation, Justice Scalia classifies his
approach to the Constitution as textualise3: "What I look for in the Constitution is precisely what I look for in a statute: the original meaning of the text,
not what the original draftsmen intended."34 In his Harvard Foreword

28. Paul Brest, The Misconceived Quest for the Original Understanding, 60 B.U. L. REV.
204, 234 (1980) (noting that text is of limited importance in case law); Richard H. Fallon, Jr., A
Constructivist Coherence Theory of Constitutional Interpretation, 100 HARV. L. REv. 1189, 1195
( 1987) ("If there is any surprise, it is how seldom the text is relied on directly, in comparison with
arguments based on historical intent, precedent, and social policy or moral principle."); Thomas C.
Grey, Do We Have an Unwritten Constitution?, 27 STAN. L. REv. 703, 707-08 (1975) ("In the important cases, reference to and analysis of the constitutional text plays a minor role."). Justice Scalia
was not the modem era's first textualist on the Supreme Court. Justice Black was a textualist. For a
comparison of the textualism of Justice Scalia and Justice Black, see Michael Gerhardt, A Tale of
Two Textualists: A Critical Comparison of Justices Black and Scalia, 74 B.U. L. REv. 25 (1994).

29. See Jeffrey Rosen, Textualism and the Constitution: Introduction, 66 GEo. WASH. L.
REV. 1081 (1998).
30.

Planned Parenthood of Se. Penn. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833,998 (1992) (Scalia, J., dissent-

ing).

31. For examples of this argument, see KEITH E. WHITTINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL INTER·
PRETATION: TEXTUAL MEANING, ORIGINAL INTENT, AND JUDICIAL REVIEW 152-57 (1999); Lilian
R. BeVier, The Moment and the Millennium: A Question of Time, or Law?, 66 GEo. WASH. L. REV.
1112 (1998); Frank H. Easterbrook, Textualism and the Dead Hand, 66 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 1119,
1121 (1998); and Scalia, supra note 25, at 862.
32.

See Scalia, supra note 25, at 862.

33.

See SCALIA, supra note 25, at 24-25,37-41.

34.

/d. at 38.
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The Document and the Doctrine, Professor Amar offers a similar conception
of textualism:
I mean to defend a spacious but not unbounded version of constitutional
textualism. On this view, textual analysis dovetails with the study of enactment history and constitutional structure. The joint aim of these related
approaches is to understand what the American People meant and did
when We ratified and amended the document.
... What counts as text is the document as understood by the American
People who ratified and amended it, and what counts as history is accessible public meaning, not secret private intent. 15

Following Justice Scalia and Professor Amar, I use the term textualism
to refer to the school of thought that seeks to construe the Constitution in
accordance with the original meaning of the text. Originalism, in contrast, is
the overarching term for two related approaches: proponents of original intent seek to interpret the Constitution in accordance with the intent of the
drafters, while proponents of original understanding seek to interpret the
Constitution in accordance with the understanding of the ratifiers. 36 Textualism thus represents a search for the public meaning of constitutional text at
the time that text was written and ratified: originalism reflects a search for
the subjective intent of particular sets of historical actors.
Originalism, rather than textualism, was the first prominent response to
value-based constitutionalism. 37 But academics criticized originalism on
historicist grounds. They questioned whether original intent or original understanding could be discovered. They argued that discerning how a group
of people interpreted particular words was problematic--even if there were
strong evidence as to how the text was interpreted-because some in the
group may not have considered particular issues and because many may
have disagreed. 38 Perhaps more importantly, in a widely influential article,
The Original Understanding of Original Intent, 39 H. Jefferson Powell argued
that the original understanding was that original understanding was irrele-

35.

Amar, supra note I, at 28-29.

36. For helpful discussion of relevant terminology, see JACK N. RAKOVE, ORIGINAL MEANINGS: POLITICS AND IDEAS IN THE MAKING OF THE CONSTITUTION 8 ( 1996).
37. See RAOUL BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY 363 (1977); Robert H. Bork, Neutral
Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J. I (1971 ); Edwin Meese III, Address
before the D.C. Chapter of the Federalist Society Lawyers Division, in INTERPRETING LAW AND
LITERATURE: A HERMENEUTIC READER 25 (Sanford Levinson & Steven Mailloux eds., 1988);
Edwin Meese III, The Battle For The Constitution: The Attomey General Replies to His Critics, 35
PoL'Y REV. 32, 34 (1985), reprinted in 19 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 22, 26 (1985); Edwin Meese III,
Toward a Jurisprudence of Original Intent, II HARV. J.L. & Pus. PoL'Y 5 (1988); William H.
Rehnquist, Observation, The Notion of a Living Constitution, 54 TEx. L. REV. 693 (1976).
38. See, e.g., RONALD DWORKIN, A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE 38-57 (1985); Brest, supra note
28, at 209-17; Henry Paul Monaghan, Stare Decisis and Constitutional Adjudication, 88 CoLUM. L.
REV. 723,726 (1988).
39. H. Jefferson Powell, The Original Understanding of Original Intent, 98 HARV. L. REV.
885 (1985).
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vant. 40 Powell thus neatly turned originalism on its head: if Powell were
right, a true originalist would reject original intent.
Significantly, neither of these arguments from history undermined textualism. Powell's evidence only bore on whether the framers' intent (original
intent) was relevant to constitutional interpretation, not whether the ratifiers'
intent (original understanding) was relevant. 41 More fundamentally, as Henry
Monaghan observed, the problematic character of searching for how a group
of people read constitutional text (a search at the heart of both original intent
and original understanding) suggested a distinct strategy:
The relevant inquiry must focus on the public understanding of the language when the Constitution was developed. Hamilton put it well:
"whatever may have been the intention of the framers of a constitution, or
of a law, that intention is to be sought for in the instrument itself, according to the usual & established rules of construction." 42

Similarly, historian Jack Rakove argued that the record of the founding indicates that the framers believed "[t]he text and structure of the document
would provide the locus of interpretation; historical evidence of the debates
would not be relevant."43 In short, textualism has the same fundamental appeal as originalism-both interpretive schools claimed the virtues of
determinacy and majoritarian sanction-but it was not subject to the same
historical attacks.
Finally, textualism's rise is a product of the fact that two textualists, Justice Scalia and Justice Thomas, were named to the Supreme Court. Their
opinions have given textualism an important place in modem constitutional
case law, and Justice Scalia's academic writings44 have been widely influential.45
In reading constitutional text, Justice Scalia and Justice Thomas have
not limited themselves to the Constitution and contemporaneous dictionaries. Although in one case Justice Scalia pointedly refused to join the part of
a majority opinion that relied on the legislative history of the Fourteenth
Amendment, implying that he viewed this history as irrelevant to constitutional interpretation,46 in other cases he and Justice Thomas have drawn on
40.

/d. at 948.

41. For a convincing analysis in this regard, see Charles A. Lofgren, The Original Understanding of Original Intent?, 5 CONST. COMMENT 77 (1988).

42. Monaghan, supra note 38, at 725 (quoting Alexander Hamilton, Final Version of an
Opinion on the Constitutionality of an Act to Establish a Bank (1791), in 8 PAPERS OF ALEXANDER
HAMILTON 97, Ill (Harold C. Syrett ed., 1965)) (footnote omitted).
43. Jack N. Rakove, The Original Intention of Original Understanding, 13 CONST. CoMMENT 159, 164-65 (1996).
44.

See supra note 25.

45. For further discussion of the rise of originalism and the subsequent rise of textual ism, see
Vasan Kesavan & Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Interpretive Force of the Constitution's Secret Drafting History, 91 GEO. L.J. 1113, 1134-48 (2003), and Randy E. Barnett, An Originalism for
Nonorigina/ists, 45 Lov. L. REv. 611,611-29 (1999).
46. See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 511 n. (1997). For discussion, see Kesavan &
Paulsen, supra note 45, at 1119-20.
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constitutional debating history, including the nonpublic debates of the
Philadelphia framers. 47 Because Justice Scalia strongly rejects legislative
history when analyzing statutes, his use of debating history is arguably inconsistent. John Manning, however, has defended this practice as consistent
with textualism because textualists "might examine the way reasonable persons actually understood a text, giving such evidence particular force if
those persons had special familiarity with the temper and events of the times
that produced that text."48 Justice Scalia has offered a similar justification:
I will consult the writings of some men who happened to be delegates to
the Constitutional Convention-Hamilton's and Madison's writings in The
Federalist, for example. I do so, however, not because they were Framers
and therefore their intent is authoritative and must be the Jaw; but rather
because their writings, like those of other intelligent and informed people
of the time, display how the text of the Constitution was originally understood. Thus I give equal weight to Jay's pieces in The Federalist, and to
Jefferson's writings, even though neither of them was a Framer. What I
look for in the Constitution is precisely what I look for in a statute: the
original meaning of the text, not what the original draftsmen intended.' 9

Debating history is relevant as evidence of usage, particularly as it illuminates the use of terms in their relevant context. 5°
Even as they draw on history, Justice Scalia and Justice Thomas's inquiry is about the public meaning of text. In propounding what they see as
the public meaning of various constitutional provisions, they have created a
substantial body of opinions turning on close readings. Thus in Harmelin v.
Michigan and again in Walton v. Arizona, Justice Scalia stresses that the
4 7.

See infra note 50.

48. John F. Manning, Textualism and the Role of The Federalist in Constitutional Adjudication, 66 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1337, 1355 (1998); see also William N. Eskridge, Jr., Should the
Supreme Court Read The Federalist but Not Statutory Legislative History?, 66 GEO. WASH. L. REv.
1301, 1319-20 (1998) (suggesting that textualists might use constitutional history but not legislative
history because of the possibility that the latter will be subject to manipulation by legislative participants in the future while the relevant materials in constitutional history have already been
produced).
49.

SCALIA, supra note 25, at 38.

50. Justice Scalia's testimony during his confirmation hearings was to the same effect. He
observed that, "if somebody should discover that the secret intent of the framers was quite different
from what the words seem to connote, it would not make any difference" as far as he was concerned. Nomination of Judge Antonin Scalia to be Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the
United States: Hearings Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 99th Cong. 108 (1986), quoted in
George Kannar, The Constitutional Catechism of Antonin Scalia, 99 YALE L.J. 1297, 1307 (1990).
This rejection of drafters' intent does not mean that Justice Scalia has categorically refused to draw
on the nonpublic debates of the Philadelphia drafters: he has. See. e.g., Printz v. United States, 521
U.S. 898, 915 n.9 (1997); Edmond v. United States, 520 U.S. 651, 660 (1997); Morrison v. Olson,
487 U.S. 654, 720 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting); Sun Oil Co. v. Wortman, 486 U.S. 717, 723
(1988). Justice Thomas has also relied on the Philadelphia debates. On Justice Thomas's use of
historical sources, see Melvyn R. Durchslag, The Supreme Court and the Federalist Papers: Is There
Less Here than Meets the Eye, 14 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 243, 248-49, 303-04 (2005). For an
example of Justice Thomas's use of the Philadelphia debates, see United States v. lnt'l Bus. Mach.
Corp., 517 U.S. 843, 859-60 (1996). For discussion of the use of the Philadelphia debates by Justice
Scalia and Justice Thomas, see Vasan Kesavan & Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Interpretive Force of
the Constitution's Secret Drafting History, 91 GEO. L.J. 1113, 1119-20, 1186 (2003 ).
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Eighth Amendment bars "cruel and unusual" punishment, not "cruel or unusual" punishment. 51 In his dissent in Morrison v. Olson, Justice Scalia
posits that the use of the word "inferior" in the Vesting Clause of Article III
illuminates the use of the word "inferior" in the Appointments Clause of
Article II, 52 and in his opinion in Freytag v. Commissioner he turns to the
usage of the term "Courts of Law" in Article III to support his understanding
of that term in the Appointments Clause of Article Il. 53 In Kelo v. City of
New London, Justice Thomas defines "public use" in the Fifth Amendment's
Takings Clause by reference to the way in which the word "use" is employed in Article I clauses governing the levying of duties on imports and
exports by states and the raising of an army by Congress, and he argues that
if the original understanding of federal eminent domain power had been a
broad one, the phrase "general welfare," employed in the Preamble and in
the General Welfare Clause of Article I, would have been employed in the
Fifth Amendment instead of "public use."54 In United States v. Lopez, Justice
Thomas supports his argument that the word "commerce" in the Commerce
Clause is limited to sale and transport by arguing that that is how the word
"commerce" is understood in the Port Preference Clause,55 and in U.S. Term
Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, he finds significance in the fact that, in the Constitution, the term "United States" takes a plural verb. 56
While they closely parse the Constitution's text, neither Justice has tried
to systematically work out canons of textualist interpretation. The scholar
who has most fully attempted to work out and apply a textualist methodology is Professor Amar. His article lntratextualism and his Harvard Foreword
The Document and the Doctrine are largely methodological, and his books
The Bill of Rights and America's Constitution demonstrate that methodology
at work. Leading textualist scholars have repeatedly and consistently

51. Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 966 (1991); Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639,670
( 1990) (Scalia, J., concurring and dissenting). A textualist might respond to my highlighting of these
cases by observing that Justice Scalia was simply following the constitutional text and that the
Eighth Amendment, after all, uses "and;' not "or." But Justice Scalia is making an assumption here
about how people at the time of the Eighth Amendment's ratification would have construed the
phrasing, and his assumption reflects current usage. Eighteenth-century courts, however, were capable of reading "and" as "or" when the facts warranted. See Kerlin's Lessee v. Bull, I U.S. (I Dall.)
175, 178 (Pa. 1786) ("The words of the Act are, after the death of any father and mother, so that he
was not within the words; but I am of opinion, that the word and, in this place, must be construed or
...."). Professor Eskridge uses Kerlin's Lessee to illustrate the fact that courts at the time of the
founding engaged in equitable interpretation of statutes. William N. Eskridge, Jr., All About Wonts:
Early Understandings Of The "Judicial Power" In Statutory Interpretation, 1776--1806, 101
CoLUM. L. REv. 990, 1022-23 (2001). The related point here is that it cannot be assumed that eighteenth-century interpreters would have read constitutional text closely the way Justice Scalia, Justice
Thomas, and Professor Amar do.
52.

Morrison, 487 U.S. at 719-20 (Scalia, J., dissenting).

53. Freytag v. Comm., 501 U.S. 868, 902 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
54.

Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 509-10 (2005) (Thomas, J., dissenting).

55.

United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549,587 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring).

56. U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 846 n.l (Thomas, J., dissenting). For
discussion, see supra text accompanying note 3.
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applauded Amar's approach as constitutionalism of the highest order and
have embraced his conclusions. 57 His work is therefore a fitting subject of
analysis to determine whether constitutional textualism tracks original
meaning.
This Part discusses Professor Amar's methodology and its implications
in The Bill of Rights. Before beginning that discussion, however, I would
like to discuss prior scholarship on the interpretive approaches of the founding generation. While constitutional textualists embrace what I call closereading textualism, no one has explained why the conventions they employ
capture the way the text was originally read. 58 Amar and others such as Justice Scalia and Justice Thomas simply assume that close readings capture
original meaning. No one has argued that textualists' interpretive practices
do not capture original meaning.
This Article grapples with the question of whether close-reading textualism captures original meaning. The most relevant scholarly debate concerns
the original interpretive practices governing the reading of statutes (rather
than the Constitution). John Manning, the leading academic voice in the
modern textualist movement in statutory interpretation, has argued that
originalist evidence best comports with the "faithful agent" theory under
which "judges have a duty to discern and enforce legislative instructions as
accurately as possible and to abide by those commands when legislative
intent is clear."59 Although not rigidly literal, Manning's account stresses the
extent to which, in the founding era, statutes were seen as determinate in
meaning, and the judicial role was highly constrained because of this textual
determinacy. William Eskridge has responded with his own, very different,
analysis of founding-era historical evidence of statutory interpretation:
The central Jesson of the early period, best embodied in the work of John
Marshall, is that statutory interpretation is all about words, but words are
about much more than dictionaries and ordinary usage; they also involve
policies chosen by the legislature and enduring principles suggested by the
common law, the law of nations, and the Constitution.''"

In the realm of constitutional interpretation, this Article reaches conclusions that parallel those Eskridge reached with respect to statutory
interpretation. Eskridge stresses the nontextual sources of statutory meaning
and the ways in which equitable concerns shaped judicial decisions. Similarly, I challenge the view that text-focused interpretation-paying careful

57.

See supra text accompanying notes 11-16.

58. Caleb Nelson, Originalism and Interpretive Conventions, 10 U. CHI. L. REV. 519, 51921 (2003) (noting the dearth of work on recovering the founders' interpretive conventions). Professor Nelson's superb study is, in a limited way, an exception. He is concerned with a particular
convention (which is not one at issue in this Article}-whether the founding genemtion thought that
early practice "fixed" the meaning of ambiguous constitutional text. See id. at 521-23.
59. John F. Manning, Deriving Rules of Statutory Interpretation from the Constitution, 101
CoLUM. L. REv. 1648, 1648 n.l (2001}; see also John F. Manning, Textualism and the Equity of the
Statute, I 0 I CoLUM. L. REv. I (200 I) (presenting a historical case for "faithful agent" approach).
60.

Eskridge, supra note 51, at 998.
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attention to the words of the Constitution and their placement and assuming
a unitary ideological vision-captures original meaning. I show that that
approach reflects erroneous assumptions about the way the founders understood the document.
This Article is also consistent with my earlier work on the original understanding of judicial review, although that earlier work did not primarily
address textualist claims. 61 My previous article showed that judicial review
was more common than previously recognized. I argued that early case law
reflects a structural and process-based approach to judicial review rather
than a textualist approach. Structural concerns, rather than the parsing of
texts, were the dominant influence on these decisions. Courts understood
constitutional prohibitions very broadly in certain areas and viewed statutes
with complete deference in others.
Both Eskridge's work on the original understanding of statutory interpretation and my work on the original understanding of judicial review
indicate that the founding generation, when confronted with questions of
interpretation, did not closely parse text. But modern constitutional textualists such as Amar assume that the founders approached constitutional text
with extraordinary care; they posit that the Constitution reflects a coherent,
unified vision and that its words were chosen and its clauses placed with
extraordinary attention. This is an error, and this Article shows how it leads
to misunderstandings of original meaning.
A. Amar's Textualism

In his Foreword The Document and the Doctrine and in his article lntratextualism, Professor Amar sets forth a series of interpretive techniques
for reading the Constitution. He posits that the Constitution should be read
holistically, that the words and phrases used in the Constitution should be
used to gloss other words and phrases in the Constitution, and that location
matters.
In arguing for "read[ing] holistically," 62 Amar claims that the various
parts of the Constitution reflect a common vision: "How could we forget
that our Constitution is a single document, and not a jumble of disconnected
clauses-that it is a Constitution we are expounding?"63 It is a "single coherent constitution"64 manifesting "a deep design"65 :
The American People ratified the Philadelphia Constitution not clause by
clause, but as a single document. Later generations of Americans have
added amendments one by one, but no amendment stands alone as a
61.

See Treanor, supra note 7.

62.

/d. at 30.

63.

AMAR, supra note 8, at 125; see also Amar, lntratextualism, supra note I0, at 795 (arguing that interpreters should "take[) seriously the document as a whole rather than as a jumbled grab
bag of assorted clauses").
64.

Amar, lntratextualism, supra note 10, at 822.

65.

/d. at 814.
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discrete legal regime. Each amendment aims to fit with, and be read as part
of, the larger document. Indeed, because the People have chosen to affix
amendments to the end of the document rather than directly rewrite old
clauses, a reader can never simply look to an old clause and be done with
it. Rather, she must always scour later amendments to see if they explicitly
or implicitly modify the clause at hand. To do justice to these basic facts
about the text, we must read the document holistically and attend to its
overarching themes. 66

Thus Amar's approach to constitutional interpretation begins, as Adrian
Vermeule and Ernest Young have observed, with the assumption that the
Constitution "displays strong substantive coherence across different provisions."67
Amar calls his glossing technique "intratextualism."68 lntratextualism assigns interpretive weight to the "important word patterns in the
Constitution."69 This analysis can proceed in three ways. Uses of a word
elsewhere in the Constitution can illustrate what the term means: "[T]he
Constitution ... thus serves a basic dictionary function." 70 Intratextualism
can also involve "[u]sing the Constitution as a [c]oncordance ... enabling
and encouraging us to place nonadjoining clauses alongside each other for
analysis because they use the same (or very similar) words and phrases.
Once we accept the invitation to read noncontiguous provisions together, we
may see important patterns at work." 71 The final type of intratextualism
"demands that two (or more) similarly phrased constitutional commands be
read in pari materia .... [W]e read the commands as if a metacommand
clause existed telling us to construe parallel commands in parallel fashion." 72
Summing up the three types of intratextualism, Amar writes: "To oversimplify slightly: dictionary-like intratextualism tells us what the Constitution
could mean; concordance-like intratextualism tells us what it should mean;
and rulebook-like intratextualism tells us what it must mean."73
Finally, Amar argues for "squeez[ing] meaning from the Constitution's
organization chart."74 While intratextualism focuses on word patterns, this
approach focuses on the placement of clauses and figures heavily in Amar's
book on the Bill of Rights. In Intratextualism, Amar suggests a variety of
other ways in which this approach could illuminate constitutional meaning:
66. Amar, supra note I, at 29-30; see also Amar, Yale School, supra note 10, at 2001 ("Because the document forms a coherent whole, sensitive readers must go beyond individual clauses to
ponder the larger constitutional systems, patterns, structures, and relationships at work.").
67. Adrian Vermeule & Ernest A. Young, Hercules, Herben, and Amar: The Trouble with
Intratextualism, 113 HARV. L. REv. 730, 749 (2000).
68.

Amar,lntratextualism, supra note 10, at 748.

69.

Amar, supra note I, at 30.

70.

Amar, lntratextualism, supra note I 0, at 791.

71.

!d. at 792-93.

72.

/d. at 794-95.

73.

/d. at 795.

74.

/d. at 797 n.I97.
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Arguments in this tradition might point to the special place of textual
honor held by the Constitution's first three words as evidence of popular
sovereignty as the document's first principle; or to the very existence of
separate Articles I, II, and III as evidence of the separation of powers and
the coextensiveness of the three great federal departments; or to the
firstness of Article I as evidence of Congress' primacy; or to the location of
the Veto clause in Article I as evidence that this presidential power is legislative in nature. 75

Amar believes that some of the textual linkages that holistic readings reveal were consciously intended. "Other times," he acknowledges, "the
pattern that we discern upon reflection may not have been specifically intended, but is still far from random." 76 Yet regardless of whether it is
specifically intended or not, this form of textual analysis is a source of insight for the constitutional interpreter:
A great play may contain a richness of meaning beyond what was clearly
in the playwright's mind when the muse came; ordinary language contains
depths of association that not even our best poets fully understand, even as
they intuit; and a judicial opinion may build better than its author knew. So
too with the Constitution. 77

Amar believes that textual readings should reflect an understanding of
history:
By pondering the public legislative history of these carefully chosen
words, we can often learn more about what they meant to the American
People who enacted them as the supreme law of the land. Thus, good historical narrative, in both a broad (epic-events) sense and a narrow
(drafting/ratification) sense, should inform good textual analysis; with uncanny economy, the text often distills hard-won historical lessons and
drafting insights. 78

Both debating history and the broader history of an era bear on constitutional understanding. But the words of the document remain at the center of
the analysis. In Amar's formulation, "[a] good historical narrative ... should
inform good textual analysis." 79 History is relevant, not as an independent
guide to meaning, but because it illuminates text.

75. /d. Amar also describes a related interpretive doctrine that he calls intertextualism. Intertextualism involves "comparisons between clauses in the Constitution on one hand and clauses in
other documents on the other." /d. at 795 n.186. In practice, however, he accords great weight interpretive weight to intratextualism (related words in the Constitution) and little to words in other
documents. See Patrick 0. Gudridge, Remember Endo?, 116 HARV. L. REv. 1933, 1961 n.l34
(2003) ("[Amar] notes but does not make much use of 'intertextualism,' juxtapositions of constitutional wordings with other phrasings in other documents."). Not surprisingly, while he has written a
major article on intratextualism, he has not written an article on intertextualism. A fundamental
element of his interpretive approach is to privilege the constitutional text above other sources.
76.

Amar, Intratextualism, supra note 10, at 793.

77.

!d. at 793-94.

78.

Amar, supra note I, at 29.

79.

/d. (emphasis added).
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B. Amar's Bill of Rights and Original Meaning
Professor Amar provides only a limited number of case studies of his
approach in The Document and the Doctrine and Intratextualism. His book
The Bill of Rights provides a richer illustration of his textualist approach.
This Section will look at the conclusions he reaches in that book and discuss
his claim that the conclusions he derives from close-reading textualism reflect original meaning. Subsequent Parts will show how he uses his close
reading of the text to reach the conclusions embraced in The Bill of Rights
and how those conclusions are fundamentally at odds with original meaning.
In The Bill of Rights, Amar employs textualism to alter the pedigree of
the Constitution's protection of individual liberties. "The essence of the Bill
of Rights," he contends, "was more structural than not, and more majoritarian than counter."80 The original Bill of Rights "seems largely republican
and collective, sounding mainly in political rights, in the public liberty of
the ancients.',s 1 It is "a document attentive to structure, focused on the
agency problem of government, and rooted in the sovereignty of We the
People of the United States."82 The "agency problem"-the focus of the Bill
of Rights-was "the danger that government officials might attempt to rule
in their own self-interest at the expense of their constituents' sentiments and
liberty.''83
While Amar sees the Bill of Rights as protecting certain individual
rights, that was "not the sole, or even the dominant, motif' 84 of the document. The founders were concerned primarily with government's ability to
deny the majority power: "[l]n the 1780s, liberty was still centrally understood as public liberty of democratic self-government-majoritarian liberty
rather than liberty against popular majorities."85 "Madison thought otherwise," Amar adds, "but [he] was a man ahead of his time." 86 Thus the fact
that Madison, the primary author of the Bill of Rights, was not part of what
Amar depicts as the consensus view is both noted and dismissed. Indeed, the
vision underlying the Bill of Rights was not, at its base, a Federalist vision.
Rather, the Bill of Rights reflected Anti-Federalism: ''To some extent,
[Madison's] sponsorship of the Bill must be seen as a sop--a peace offering-to Anti-Federalists; and many in the First Congress were relatively
uninterested in the Bill, finding it a 'nauseous' distraction." 87

80.

AMAR, supra note 8, at xiii.

81.

/d. at 133.

82.

/d. at 127.

83.

/d. at 82.

84.

/d. at xii.

85. ld. at 159; see also id. at 68 ("[T]he agency problem [was] of protecting the people generally from self-interested government policy ....").
86.

/d. at 159--60.

87. ld. at 289. See also id. at 302 (''The Bill of Rights ... was initially an Anti-Federalist
idea that moderate Federalists ultimately accepted and adjusted.").
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Unlike the founding generation, the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment sought principally to safeguard minorities and individual liberties.
Thus the Fourteenth Amendment "seems more liberal and individualistic,
sounding mainly in civil rights, in the private liberty of the moderns."88
Amar sums up the argument of The Bill of Rights in the following passage:
[T]he 1789 Bill tightly knit together citizens' rights and states' rights; but
the 1866 amendment unraveled this fabric, vesting citizens with rights
against states. The original Bill also focused centrally on empowering the
people collectively against government agents following their own agenda.
The Fourteenth Amendment, by contrast, focused on protecting minorities
against even responsive, representative, majoritarian government. Over and
over, the 1789 Bill proclaimed "the right[s]" and "the powers" of "the people"-phrases conjuring up civic republicanism, collective political action,
public rights, and positive liberty. The complementary phrase in the 1866
amendment-"privileges or immunities of citizens"-indicates a subtle but
real shift of emphasis, reflecting a vision more liberal than republican,
more individualistic than collectivist, more private than public, more negative than positive. 89

The proponents of the Fourteenth Amendment thus transformed the meaning
of the underlying document as they incorporated protections against the
states.
In analyzing textualism, this Article is not concerned with the latter half
of Amar's book treating the Reconstruction amendments. Amar argues that
the text of the Constitution as it existed before those amendments should be
read differently because of the later amendments. For example, according to
Amar, the ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment alters the way in which
we should read the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. 90 Amar's
conception that the Constitution as a whole must be reinterpreted as new
amendments are adopted is not idiosyncratic,91 but neither is it representative
of the approach of other textualists, and it will not be treated here. Equally
important, this Article is limited to the issue of whether modern textualism
captures the original meaning of the Constitution and the Bill of Rights. I
am not concerned with the way in which later generations understood the
Constitution and its amendments. 92
One final question must be addressed before examining the historical validity of Amar's textualism: does Amar believe that his readings recapture
original meaning? Like Justice Scalia and other textualists, Amar does make

88.

/d. at 133.

89.

/d. at 215-16.

90. See AMAR, supra note 8, at 282-83; see also Amar, lntratextualism, supra note 10, at
772-73 ("[A]fter the ratification of [the Fourteenth Amendment], equal protection should also be
seen as implicit in the Fifth Amendment phrase 'due process of law.'").
91. See, e.g., Reva B. Siegel, She the People: The Nineteenth Amendment Sex Equality, Federalism, and the Family, 115 HARV. L. REv. 947 (2002).
92. For a jurisprudential (rather than historical) critique of Amar's use of textualism to fuse
constitutional text enacted during different periods, see Vermeule & Young, supra note 67.
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this claim. Thus in the introduction to The Bill of Rights, he announces that
he is "offering an integrated overview of the Bill of Rights as originally
conceived,"93 and he repeatedly asserts he is recapturing original meaning. 94
Similarly, The Document and the Doctrine asserts that his aim is "to understand what the American people meant and did when We ratified and
amended the document."95
Nonetheless, in Intratextualism Amar suggests, perhaps as a fall-back
position, that it does not matter whether his interpretive techniques produce
readings that were "specifically intended"96 : "[T]he pattern that we discern
upon reflection may not have been specifically intended, but is still far from
random."97 He compares the Constitution to a literary work: "A great play
may contain a richness of meaning beyond what was clearly in the playwright's mind when the muse came .... So too with the Constitution."98
This assertion is striking. It reflects the gap between Amar's methodology of recovering original meaning and the reality of the way in which
constitutional documents are understood at the time of their creation. By
ignoring drafting history and treating the Constitution as emanating from the
American people in the same way that a work of art comes from its author,
Amar overlooks the extent to which the Constitution and the Bill of Rights
were shaped by the decisions of particular historical actors.
Although the analytic flaws of Amar's approach as applied to the unamended Constitution are beyond the scope of this Article, the gap between
Amar's conception of a document springing full blown from the brow of the
American people and the reality of a document drafted by particular historical actors is important and should be noted. Two individuals played critical
roles in forming the Constitution. James Madison was principally responsible for the Virginia Plan, the plan of government introduced at the start of
the Philadelphia convention.99 As historian Clinton Rossiter has observed,
"[e]laborated, tightened, amended, and refined under three months of unceasing pressure-much of which Madison resented at the time-the

93.

AMAR, supra note 8, at xii (emphasis added).

94. The Introduction and the first chapter include multiple other examples. ld. at xiii ("[T]his
first issue was indeed first in the minds of those who framed the Bill of Rights."); id. at 8 ("[T]he
words that we refer to as the First Amendment really weren't 'first' in the minds of the First Congress."); id. at 14 ("[l]t is not surprising that the First Congress's First Amendment attempted further
fine tuning of the structure of representation in the lower house."); id. at 18 ("[B]oth amendments
were attempts to strengthen majoritarianism rather than check it, for both sought to tighten the link
between representatives and their constituents ....").
95. Amar, supra note I, at 29; see also id. at 27 ("What the American People have said and
done in the Constitution is often more edifying, inspiring, and sensible than what the Justices have
said and done in the case law."); id. at 29 ("By pondering the public legislative history of these carefully chosen words, we can often learn more about what they meant to the American People who
enacted them as the supreme law of the land.").
96.

Amar, lntratextualism, supra note 10, at 793.

97.

ld.

98.

ld. at 793-94.

99.

CLINTON ROSSITER, 1787:THEGRANDCONVENTION 161 (1966).
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Virginia Plan became the Constitution of the United States." 100 At the other
end of the process, Gouverneur Morris was given responsibility by the
Committee on Style for taking the various proposals and votes and putting
them into a final polished document. The Constitution, Morris subsequently
boasted in a letter to Timothy Pickering, "was written by the fingers which
write this letter." 101 In a letter he authored at the end of his life, Madison acknowledged Morris's role: "The finish ... fairly belongs to the pen of Mr.
Morris .... '[A] better choice' ... 'could not have been made.' ... It is true
that the state of the materials . . . was a good preparation ... but there was
sufficient room for the talents and taste stamped by the author on the face of
it." 102
The Bill of Rights, like the Constitution, did not emerge whole cloth
from "the People" but rather was drafted. In this case, there was only one
principal author-James Madison. Madison's initial proposal was modified
in a number of ways by the House and then the Senate, but the language
remained largely his. 103
As a result, if one seeks deep and unintended meanings in the Constitution and the Bill of Rights in the same way that a literary critic might seek
them in a play, one is largely plumbing the minds of Madison and Morris. I
do not know of any theory of constitutional interpretation under which the
personal, unconscious views of the drafter are an appropriate basis for legal
interpretation. (Amar certainly does not offer a justification for such a view.)
Moreover, Madison and Morris are not the most representative thinkers of
their era, so their unconscious thoughts are hardly a good stand-in for the
unconscious thoughts of the American people. Finally, to the extent that
there are hidden meanings in the Constitution, questions about Morris's fairmindedness as a drafter make giving legal effect to those meanings particularly problematic. There has been ongoing debate among scholars about
whether Morris fairly synthesized the work of the Convention. 104 At the time
I00.

/d.

10 I.

/d. at 225.

102.

ld.

103. See infra Parts II-III; see a/so CREATING THE BILL OF RIGHTS: THE DocUMENTARY
RECORD FROM THE FIRST CONGRESS xiv-xvi (Helen E. Veit et al. eds., 1991) [hereinafter DocUMENTARY RECORD).
104. In addition to the Territories Clause, scholars have focused on the Committee of Style's
use of a semicolon before the start of the General Welfare Clause. When initially approved by the
convention, the clause was preceded by a comma. 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION
OF 1787 493, 569 (Max Farrand ed., rev. ed. 1966) [hereinafter REcoRDS]. When it emerged from
the Committee on Style, the clause was preceded by a semicolon, id. at 594, arguably making it a
general grant of power rather than a limitation on the taxing power. On the floor of the convention,
no one objected to (or even mentioned) the punctuation change. When the Constitution was again
printed, the semicolon had again become a comma. ld. at 655. For the allegation that Morris added
the punctuation in bad faith and the claim that Roger Sherman corrected the punctuation before the
Constitution was engrossed, see 3 RECORDS, supra, at 379 (presenting the statement of Albert
Gallatin). Academic discussion of the Committee of Style's punctuation of the General Welfare
Clause takes different positions on Morris's culpability. Compare MAX FARRAND, THE FRAMING OF
THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 182 (1913) ("The change may or may not have been
intentional ...."), and FORREST McDoNALD, Novus 0ROO SECLORUM: THE INTELLECTUAL
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of the Louisiana Purchase, Morris himself suggested that he crafted the Territories Clause with the hidden purpose of ensuring that newly acquired
territories could not become states. 105 Questions about Morris's scrupulousness are a factor weighing against reading subtleties into the document that
a reasonable reader at the time would not have grasped.
More fundamentally, an approach that reads meanings into the Constitution that were not specifically intended is an approach that has no claim to
majoritarian sanction. It is not plausible to say that a particular reading of a
text has majoritarian approval when it is a reading that people at the time of
ratification would not have been aware of. To the extent that Amar justifies
his readings on this ground, they lack the claim to democratic legitimacy
that is one of textualism's most compelling features.
The critical question concerning Professor Amar's textualism remains
whether it accurately captures original meaning. The next Part begins the
exploration of this topic by examining his analysis of the Ninth Amendment.
II. THE

NINTH AMENDMENT

The original meaning of the Ninth and Tenth Amendments for Professor
Amar may be gleaned from the title of the relevant chapter in The Bill of
Rights: "The Popular Sovereignty Amendments." 106 The Ninth Amendment
was "a federalism clause intertwined with the Tenth Amendment," and it
"began as a republican affirmation of collective rights of the people." 107
While Amar's point that collective rights were part of the Ninth Amendment's "rights ... retained by the people" is legitimate, his basic thesis that
the amendment "began as a republican affirmation of collective rights of the
people" is wrong because it denies that the amendment was fundamentally
concerned with the protection of individual rights.
Amar's account of the Ninth Amendment is deeply flawed in part because, employing his textualist approach, he assumes that location is a
ORIGINS OF THE CONSTITUTION 265 (1985) ("Morris made a clever attempt ... .''), with ROSSITER,
supra note 99, at 228-29 ("[Morris] was a faithful servant of the committee and the committee of
the Convention.''), and David Engdahl, The Basis of the Spending Power, 18 SEATTLE U. L. REV.
215, 252-53 (1995) (describing Morris's misbehavior as a "myth"). Despite his position that inter·
pretive weight should be given to underlying meanings that "The People" did not specifically intend,
see supra text accompanying notes 95-97, Professor Amaris aware of the claims that Morris intentionally attempted to alter the punctuation of the general welfare clause to alter its meaning. See
Akhil Reed Amar, Our Forgotten Constitution: A Bicentennial Comment, 97 YALE L.J. 281, 286
n.25 (1987) ("Professor Farrand offers a fascinating account of a clause in which an apparently
small change in punctuation was attempted in order to effect a large change in meaning.")
105.

He wrote:

I always thought that, when we should acquire Canada and Louisiana it would proper to govern them as provinces, and allow them no voice in our councils. In wording the third section of
the fourth article, I went as far as circumstances would permit to establish the exclusion. Can·
dor obliges me to add my belief, that, had it been more pointedly expressed, a strong
opposition would have been made.
3 RECORDS, supra note 103, at 404. For discussion, see McDONALD, supra note I 04, at 282-83.
106.

AMAR, supra note 8, at 119.

107.

/d. at 280.
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powerful guide to meaning and that meaning can be deduced from looking
at the finished document rather than from probing drafting history. He assigns great weight to the fact that the Ninth and Tenth Amendments are next
to each other. But this was a coincidence. When Madison proposed his
amendments, he wanted them inserted into the constitutional document, not
added to the end. And the predecessors of the Ninth and the Tenth Amendment were at very different places on his list of amendments. They
eventually wound up together because of a series of legislative decisions
having nothing to do with a sense they were linked.
While a modem reader such as Amar might naturally interpret "rights"
of "the people" as reflecting principally collective rights rather than the individual's rights-rights that "the people" rather than the individual could
assert against the government-eighteenth-century usage was not so limited.
The term "rights of the people" was used to encompass individual rights.
While Amar bolsters his textual account by drawing on some historical
evidence concerning the demand for protection of the popular right to
change governments, he ignores evidence of the demand for protection of
individual rights, a demand that was at least as strongly pressed. 108
A. Amar's Thesis

Amar bitingly observes that "[t]o see the Ninth Amendment, as originally written, as a palladium of countermajoritarian individual rights-like
privacy-is to engage in anachronism." 109 His argument is based in part on
his literal reading of the text. He understands the Ninth Amendment's
"rights ... retained by the people" to mean rights the people collectively
retain rather than individual rights: it is about the rights of the people, not
the rights of the person. The "core meaning" of the phrase "the people" in
the Ninth Amendment is "conspicuously collective" 110 :
[T]he most obvious and inalienable right underlying the Ninth Amendment
is the collective right of We the People to alter or abolish government,
through the distinctly American device of the constitutional convention.
We have already seen that this clarifying gloss-with antecedents in virtually every state constitution-was initially proposed as a prefix to the
Preamble, only to be dropped for stylistic reasons and resurrected in the
First Amendment's explicit right of "the people" to assemble in convention.111

Amar also appeals to "[t]he legislative history of [the Ninth and Tenth]
amendments[, which] confirms their close interrelations with each other and
108. For a helpful discussion of the literature on the Ninth Amendment and a defense of the
view that the Amendment protected individual rights as well as a narrow construction of the powers
of the national government, see Randy E. Barnett, The Ninth Amendment: It Means What It Says, 85
TEx. L. REV. I (2006).
109.

AMAR, supra note 8, at 120.

110.

/d.

Ill.

/d.
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with the Preamble, and their obvious implications for the people's right to
alter or abolish." 112 He argues that the discussion of such principles at the
ratifying conventions of Virginia and New York is relevant to an understanding of the Ninth Amendment. Virginia declared at her convention that "the
powers granted under the Constitution, being derived from the people of the
United States, may be resumed by them, whensoever the same shall be perverted to their injury or oppression, and that every power not granted
thereby remains with them, at their will ...." 113 New York similarly requested an amendment ensuring the following:
[T]he powers of government may be reassumed by the people whensoever
it shall become necessary to their happiness; that every power, jurisdiction,
and right, which is not by the said Constitution clearly delegated to the
Congress of the United States, or the departments of the government
thereof, remains to the people of the several states, or to their respective
state governments, to whom they may have granted the same .... 114

Amar further observes that both the Declaration of Independence and
Hamilton's Federalist No. 78 recognized the right to alter or abolish government. He concludes that "[t]he rights of 'the people' affirmed in the
Ninth and Tenth Amendments may well mean more than the right to alter or
abolish, but surely they mean at least this much at their core." 115
He finds that placement and word choice reinforce this view:
[C]onventional wisdom today misses the close triangular interrelation
among the Preamble and the Ninth and Tenth Amendments .... [L]ook
again at these texts. All are at their core about popular sovereignty. All, indeed, explicitly invoke "the people." . . . If the Ninth is mainly about
individual rights, why does it not speak of individual "persons" rather than
the collective "the people"? If the Tenth is only about states' rights, why
does it stand back-to-hack with the Ninth, and what are its last three words
doing there, mirroring the Preamble's first three? 116

The Ninth and Tenth Amendments, Amar proclaims, are "ringing affirma.
.
,111
tlons
of popu Iar sovereignty.
The Ninth Amendment is also about federalism, and Amar again draws
on placement and word choice to construct his argument:
[O]n a federalism-based reading, the Ninth and Tenth fit together snugly,
as their words and their legislative history make clear; but each amendment
complements the other without duplicating it. The Tenth says that Congress must point to some explicit or implicit enumerated power before it
112.

ld. at 121.

113. /d. (quoting I THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION
OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 327 (Jonathan Elliot ed., 2d ed., Washington, Taylor & Maury
1836) (hereinafter ELLIOT's DEBATES]).
114.

/d. at 122 (quoting I ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note I 13, at 327).

115.

/d.

116.

/d. at 121.

117.

/d. at 124.
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can act; and the Ninth addresses the closely related but distinct question of
whether such express or implied enumerated power in fact exists. 118

Amar adds that "the federalism roots of the Ninth Amendment, and its links
to the unique enumerated-power strategy of Article I, help explain why no
previous state constitution featured language precisely like the Ninth's-a
fact conveniently ignored by most mainstream accounts." 119 In short, the
Ninth Amendment-in addition to protecting group rights-means that a
right's presence in the Bill of Rights does not mean there is necessarily a
federal power to adopt legislation abridging that right. 120
Individual rights are absent from Amar's account of the Ninth Amendment. When he observes that the "core meaning [of] the Ninth
[Amendment] is ... collective," 121 he may be leaving open the possibility
that there is protection of individual rights at the Amendment's periphery,
but that is as close as he comes to recognizing that the amendment was intended to afford any protection for individual rights.

B. Critique: Legislative History in the States
Amar's account of the legislative history of the Ninth Amendment in the
states focuses on state proposals for an amendment that would recognize the
people's right to alter or abolish government. He omits the evidence from
state ratifying conventions that supports the view that the Ninth Amendment
was concerned with protection of unenumerated individual rights. As a result, he acknowledges only a part of the states' concerns. Equally
significant, his account fails to recognize usages that indicate "rights" of the
"people" encompassed individual rights.
As noted, Amar discusses the ratification history of Virginia and New
York. He quotes the resolution of the Virginia ratifying convention concerning
the right of "people of the United States" to retake "the powers granted under the Constitution . . . whensoever the same shall be perverted to their
injury or oppression." 122 But he does not discuss the opening lines of
Virginia's resolution:
That there be a Declaration or Bill of Rights asserting and securing from
encroachment the essential and unalienable Rights of the People in some
such manner as the following:
FIRST, That there are certain natural rights of which men, when they form
a social compact cannot deprive or divest their posterity, among which are
the enjoyment of life and liberty, with the means of acquiring, possessing

118.

/d. at 123-24.

119.

/d.at124.

120.

/d.

121.

See id. at 120.

122.

See supra text accompanying note 113.
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and protecting property, and pursuing and obtaining happiness and
safety. 12)

Virginia's resolution thus opens with a request for an amendment recognizing "natural rights." These natural rights are principally, if not wholly,
rights of the individual, not the group. While "liberty" could be private or public, it is clear the right to the "enjoyment of life" was individual. Similarly, the
Virginia ratifying convention focused on an individual right to protect "the
means for acquiring, possessing, and protecting property." Finally, although
there is much debate on what the phrase "pursuit of happiness" meant to the
founding generation-and in particular what Jefferson meant in using the
phrase in the Declaration of Independence-this is likewise a right of the individual, as historian Ronald Hamowy has suggested:
When Jefferson spoke [in the Declaration of Independence] of an inalienable right to the pursuit of happiness, he meant that men may act as they
choose in their search for ease, comfort, felicity, and grace, either by owning property or not, by accumulating wealth or distributing it, by opting for
material success or asceticism, in a word, by determining the path to their
own earthly and heavenly salvation as they alone see fit. 124

The right to pursue happiness, in short, is the individual's right to pursue
personal happiness.

The delegates at Virginia's ratifying convention put these individual
rights on a list of "the essential and unalienable Rights of the People." 125 A
number of the rights that follow on that list are described as rights of a
"man," the "freeman," or the "person." This group includes civil and criminal procedure rights, the right of a conscientious objector not to serve in the
military, and the precursor to the Fourth Amendment. 126 The terms "man,"
"freeman," and "person" indicate that those rights were viewed as individual
rights, a point Amar makes elsewhere in his book. 127 Thus a close analysis of
Virginia's proposals shows that the phrase "Rights of the People" encompassed a series of individual rights, directly undercutting Amar's assertion
that "the people" in the Ninth Amendment indicates that the core meaning
of the amendment is collective. 128
New York-the other state whose ratification history Amar invokesalso proposed a series of constitutional amendments sounding in natural
rights, although it is omitted from Amar's account. Its second proposed
123. Amendments Proposed by the Virginia Convention (June 27, 1788), in DocuMENTARY
RECORD, supra note 103, at 17, 17.
124. Ronald Hamowy, Jefferson and the Scottish Enlightenment: A Critique of Garry Wills's
Inventing America: Jefferson's Declaration of Independence, 36 WM. & MARY Q. 503, 519 ( 1979).
125.

Amendments Proposed by the Virginia Convention, supra note 123, at 17.

126.

/d. at 17-19.

127.

See AMAR, supra note 8, at 64--65.

128. See id. at 120. Virginia's list included collective rights (such as the right of resistance to
arbitrary government) and individual rights. See Amendments proposed by the Virginia Convention,
supra note 123, at 17. My point is not that collective rights were not considered rights of the people;
rather, it is that, contrary to Amar, they were not the core rights to the exclusion of individual rights.
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amendment reads as follows: "That the enjoyment of Life, Liberty and the
pursuit of Happiness are essential rights which every Government ought to
respect and preserve." 129 While New York omitted the property right embraced by Virginia, by demanding protection for the "essential rights" to
"the enjoyment of Life ... and the Pursuit of Happiness" (and perhaps by its
reference to the enjoyment of liberty), the state ratifying convention was
seeking protection of individual rights.
New York also requested an amendment in which the individual right to
conscience was formulated as a "right" of the "People." 130 As in Virginia, the
New York ratifying convention considered an individual right to be a "right"
of the "People." 131
Amar's description of the "legislative history" 132 of the Ninth Amendment gives a misleading picture of the proposals made at state ratifying
conventions. He looks solely at the two conventions that invoked the people's right to alter or abolish government-New York and Virginia-and
fails to discuss those states' proposed amendments regarding the natural
right to pursue life, liberty, and happiness (which, in the case of Virginia,
specifically recognized a property right). He does not acknowledge that the
proposed amendments reflected the usage under which individual rights
were rights of the people. But the evidence indicates that individual rights
were at least as much the subject of the Ninth Amendment as the collective
rights that are the sole focus of Amar's analysis.

129. Amendments Proposed by the New York Convention (July 26, 1788), in DocuMENTARY
RECORD, supra note 103, at 21, 21.
130. /d. at 22 ("That the People have an equal, natural and unalienable right, freely and
peaceably to Exercise their Religion according to the dictates of Conscience ....").
131. In his account of the Ninth and Tenth Amendments, Amar also does not mention North
Carolina's proposals, but North Carolina's First Amendment similarly called for recognition of
natural rights. Its language followed Virginia's: "That there are certain natural rights, of which men,
when they form a social compact, cannot deprive or divest their posterity, among which are the
enjoyment of life and liberty, with the means of acquiring, possessing, and protecting property, and
pursuing and obtaining happiness and safety." North Carolina Convention Debates ( 1788}, reprinted in 2 BERNARD SCHWARTZ, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: A DocUMENTARY HISTORY 933, 966
(1971) [hereinafter DocUMENTARY HISTORY). Willie Jones, the delegate who proposed the Declaration of Rights, acknowledged that "I have, in my proposition, adopted, word for word, the Virginia
amendments, with one or two additional ones." 2 DocUMENTARY HISTORY, supra, at 933. The North
Carolina ratifying convention did not ratify (or reject) the federal Constitution; it instead proposed
amendments previous to ratification. The state ratified the federal Constitution after the Bill of
Rights was adopted. See id. at 932-33. North Carolina did not copy the Virginia language that Amar
relies on concerning the people of the United States' right to resume powers granted under the Constitution. See AMAR, supra note 8, at 121-22. See supra text accompanying note 114. The language
from Virginia that Amar quotes is not language from a proposed amendment. It is, rather, language
from the state's ratification transmittal letter. See 2 DocUMENTARY HISTORY, supra,. at 121-22, &
348 n.6 (quoting Virginia Resolution (June 26, 1788}, reprinted in I ELLIOT's DEBATES, supra note
113, at 327). Nonetheless, Virginia had a proposal that went to the same basic point, declaring that
the "doctrine of non-resistance against arbitrary power and oppression is absurd slavish." Amendments Proposed by Virginia Convention, supra note 123, at 17. North Carolina followed this
proposal. See North Carolina Convention Debates, supra, at 966-67.
132.

AMAR, supra note 8, at 119-22.
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C. Critique: Legislative History in Congress
Examination of the Ninth Amendment's legislative history in Congress
underscores the problem with Amar's approach. It provides additional evidence that "rights" of the "people" included individual rights at least as
much as collective rights. Even more dramatically, it shows that the conclusions Amar draws from the placement of the Ninth Amendment are wholly
mistaken.
When Madison initially proposed his amendments to the Constitution,
he intended that they would be inserted into the Constitution, and his proposal identified precisely where. 133 What I will call Madison's Ninth and
Tenth Amendments, the precursors of our Ninth and Tenth Amendments,
were to be inserted into the Constitution at different places. Rather than
placing them next to each other, Madison would have situated them at almost opposite ends of the document.
Madison's Tenth Amendment was part of his eighth proposal. It was to
be part of a proposed new Article VII, where it would have been combined
with a separation-of-powers provision to form the penultimate article of the
Constitution. 134 (The current Article VII, which provides that the Constitution shall go into effect when ratified by nine states, would have become
Article VIII.) 135 Placed almost at the end of the document, the separation-ofpowers provision and the Tenth Amendment would have provided an interpretive gloss on the document as a whole.
In contrast, Madison's Ninth Amendment was part of his fourth proposal. It was the final provision in a series of ten provisions that he sought to
insert in Article I, Section 9 between Clause 3 and Clause 4. 136 The placement of these provisions suggests their object and their purpose: they
pertained to Congress and thus were to be added to Article I; they were limitations on congressional power and thus were to be added to Section 9 of
Article I. Specifically, they protected rights against congressional interference and thus immediately followed the two clauses of the unamended
Constitution that protect rights against congressional infringement-the
Suspension of Habeas Corpus Clause and the Bill of Attainder-Ex Post
Facto Clause. 137
When viewed in relation to the amendments that preceded them in
Madison's proposal, Madison's Ninth Amendment clearly protected individual as well as group rights:
The exceptions here or elsewhere in the constitution, made in favor of particular rights, shall not be so construed as to diminish the just importance
of other rights retained by the people; or as to enlarge the powers delegated
133. See Madison Resolution (June 8, 1789), in DocUMENTARY RECORD, supra note 103, at
11,11-14.
134.

See id. at 13-14.

135.

/d. at 14.

136.

See id. at 12-13.

137.

U.S. CONST. art. I,§ 9, cis. 2-3.
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by the constitution; but either as actual limitations of such powers, or as
inserted merely for greater caution.m

The amendment thus directly glossed the preceding provisions that were
already in, or were to be inserted in, Article I. Some of those provisions
were unambiguously concerned with individual (as opposed to collective)
rights. For example, the immediately preceding provision was the precursor
to our Sixth Amendment. Even in Amar's account, in "the clustered rights of
confrontation, compulsory process, and counsel ... we see a genuine affirmation of rights of the accused and only the accused, rights of a single
person standing alone against the world." 139 Madison's Ninth Amendment
would have referred back to the individual rights protected in the Suspension of Habeas Corpus Clause and the Bill of Attainder-Ex Post Facto
Clause of the unamended Constitution. So these individual rights are, in the
language of Madison's Ninth Amendment, "rights retained by the people." 140
Their enumeration does not "diminish the just importance of other rights
retained by the people." 141
While Amar indicates that individual rights were at the periphery of the
Ninth Amendment, if they were there at all, it is clear that Madison considered individual rights fully encompassed in the "rights" of the Ninth
Amendment. Other statements by Madison provide further evidence that he
believed that the rights of the "people" included individual rights. His proposal concerning free speech directly referred to individual rights as rights
of the "people": ''The people shall not be deprived or abridged of their right
to speak, to write, or to publish their sentiments ...." 142 His statement concerning his ultimately unsuccessful amendment limiting the power of the
states is to the same effect. Madison would have added to the Constitution
the following provision: "No state shall violate the equal rights of conscience, of the freedom of the press, or the trial by jury in criminal cases." 143
In defending this proposal on the House floor, Madison referred to these

138. Madison Resolution, N.Y. DAILY ADVERTISER, June 8, 1789, in DocUMENTARY RECORD,
supra note 103, at II, 13.
139.

AMAR, supra note 8, at 114.

140. Madison Resolution, supra note 138, at 13. Madison's floor statement on his Ninth
Amendment also makes clear that it was a gloss on the rights provisions that would have preceded
it:
It has been objected also against a bill of rights, that, by enumerating particular exceptions to
the grant of power, it would disparage those rights which were not placed in that enumeration;
and it might follow by implication, that those rights which were not singled out, were intended
to be assigned into the hands of the General Government, and were consequently insecure.
This is one of the most plausible arguments that I have ever heard urged against the admission
of a bill of rights into this system; but, I conceive, that it may be guarded against. I have attempted it, as gentlemen may see by turning to the last clause of the 4th resolution [the Ninth
Amendment].

I ANNALS OF CoNG. col. 439 (Joseph Gales ed., 1789) (statement of Rep. Madison).
141.

Madison Resolution, supra note 138, at 13.

142.

/d. at 12.

143.

/d. at 13.
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three rights as "rights of the community." 144 Even if one were to follow Amar
and put the accent on the community in understanding the freedom of the
press and the right of trial by jury, 145 it is clear that the right of conscience,
an individual right, is for Madison a "right[] of the community."
While sparse, the legislative history of the Ninth Amendment buttresses
the conclusion that the Amendment was understood to encompass individual
rights. Connecticut delegate Roger Sherman was the main proponent of the
view that amendments should appear at the end of the Constitution rather than
be interwoven throughout the original text. He apparently made a proposal to
the House Select Committee demonstrating how Madison's proposals could
be revised and put at the end of the Constitution. 146 Madison's Ninth Amendment was folded in with other rights to become Sherman's Second
Amendment:
The people have certain natural rights which are retained by them when
they enter into society, Such are the rights of conscience in matters of religion; of acquiring property, and of pursuing happiness & safety; of
Speaking, writing, and publishing their Sentiments with decency and freedom; of peaceably Assembling to consult their common good, and of
applying to Government by petition or remonstrance for redress of grievances. Of these rights therefore they Shall not be deprived by the
government of the united States. 147

Thus among the "rights" that the "people" "retain[]" are individual rights
such as the right of conscience and of property.
Professor Amar's account does not analyze the legislative history of the
Ninth Amendment, but there is nothing there to suggest a repudiation of the
view shared by Madison and Sherman that the rights of the people included
individual rights. The significant changes in text from Madison's version of
the Ninth Amendment to the current version occurred in the House Select
Committee, and we have no record of its debates. The Committee edited the
proposal down to the first clause and tightened the text. The beginning of
Madison's proposal-"[t]he exceptions here or elsewhere in the constitution, made in favor of particular rights, shall not be so construed as to
diminish the just importance of other rights retained by the people" 148-was
modified to become the entire proposal: ''The enumeration in this Constitution of certain rights shall not be construed to deny or disparage others
retained by the people." 149 There is nothing in the shift to suggest that individual rights were now omitted from the "rights retained by the people."
144.

CONG. REG., June 8, 1789, reprinted in DOCUMENTARY RECORD, supra note 103, at 69,

145.

See AMAR, supra note 8, at 20--26, 81-118.

85.
146. Roger Sherman, Proposed Committee Report (July 21-28, 1789) in DocUMENTARY
RECORD, supra note I 03, at 266, 268 n.
147.

/d. at 267.

148.

Madison Resolution, supra note 138, at 13.

149.
29, 31.

House Committee Report (July 28, 1789), in DOCUMENTARY RECORD, supra note 103, at
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In addition to changing the text of Madison's Ninth Amendment, the
committee also slightly modified its location, although this change did not
alter its meaning either. Rather than appearing in Article I, Section 9 after
the Suspension of Habeas Clause and Bill of Attainder-Ex Post Facto
Clause, the various rights provisions (culminating with what became our
Ninth Amendment) were inserted between the two clauses. 150 The committee
changed neither the text of Madison's Tenth Amendment nor its location: it
continued to be situated alongside the separation-of-powers provision in
what was intended to become a new Article VII. 151
After the work of the Select Committee was completed, Sherman proposed that the amendments should be added to the end of the original
Constitution rather interwoven within it. He argued this was more consistent
with the practice for statutes. He also reasoned that the amendments should
be presented separately because they were to be adopted by the states,
whereas the Constitution had been adopted by the people. 152 Madison voiced
a slight preference for his original plan on the grounds of form-"there is a
neatness and propriety in incorporating the amendments into the constitution itself' 153-but Sherman's proposal prevailed.
When the House decided the amendments should be appended to the
end of the Constitution, it also reordered them in a way that had the consequence of moving what was to become the Ninth Amendment. In Madison's
proposal, the amendment constraining states-"No state shall violate the
equal rights of conscience, or the freedom of the press, or the trial by jury in
criminal cases" 154-was to be inserted into Article I, Section 10 beside the
preexisting limitations on state powers, and two amendments that were principally concerned with jury-trial rights were to be inserted into Article III. 155
The House decided to bring all these rights provisions together. What became the Ninth Amendment was pushed back, apparently so that it could
gloss all these rights provisions: both those that Madison would have inserted in Article I, Section 10 and Article III and those with which
Madison's Ninth Amendment had originally been linked. The future Ninth
Amendment became Article Fifteen. 156 The House's Bill of Rights then
closed with the two provisions that had closed Madison's proposal: the separation-of-powers amendment (Article Sixteen) and our Tenth Amendment
(Article Seventeen). 157 Presumably these last two provisions were still

150.

/d. at 30.

151.

Seeid.at32-33.

152. See CONG. REG. (Aug. 13, 1789) (quoting Roger Sherman), in DOCUMENTARY RECORD,
supra note 103, at 112, 117-18, 125-26.
153.

/d. at 112, 118 (quoting James Madison).

154.

Madison Resolution, supra note 138, at 13.

155.

See id.

156. See House Resolution and Articles of Amendment (August 24, 1789), in DocuMENTARY
RECORD, supra note 103, at 37, 41.
157.

See id.
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intended to be read as Madison had intended they be read-as a unit to
guide the interpretation of the Constitution as a whole.
Among the proposals in the House version that the Senate rejected was
Article Sixteen, the separation-of-powers provision. And so as the Bill of
Rights emerged from the Senate, the Ninth and Tenth Amendments appeared next to each other for the first time as the Eleventh and Twelfth
Amendments. 158 Thus joined, they were submitted to the States and eventually amended to the Constitution.
Professor Amar is wrong to assign significance to their proximity. The
history of their evolution indicates that the Ninth and Tenth Amendments
were not intended to be understood as a unit and that no one conceived of
them as belonging together. The ratification history in the states and the
Ninth Amendment's legislative history further vitiate Amar's claim. The
Ninth Amendment's "rights" of "the people" were individual rights, not
fundamentally collective ones.
III. THE FLAWS OF HOLISTIC TEXTUALISM
This Part builds on Part II's discussion of the Ninth Amendment to show
how the flaws of Amar's approach to the Ninth Amendment illustrate the
larger problems with Amar's analysis of the Bill of Rights. More broadly,
this Part shows why close-reading textualism is a poor guide to original
meaning.
The basic tenet of intratextualism is that, through the repetition of words
and phrases, constitutional clauses gloss each other and reveal underlying
meaning. 159 Professor Amar, Justice Scalia, and Justice Thomas practice this
method of interpretation. 160 Section liLA refutes Amar's exegesis of the concept of the "rights" of the "people." Amar's tight focus on the way words are
used in the Constitution (without adequate consideration of uses outside the
Constitution), combined with his strong presumption that the meaning of
words is constant throughout the document, leads to a misconception of the
original understanding. Intratextualism artificially cuts off relevant evidence,
emphasizing usages that appear in the document while deemphasizing other,
equally valid contemporaneous usages.
Holistic textualism insists that the location of clauses in the Constitution
reveals meaning. Building on the prior discussion of the Ninth Amendment,
Section III.B shows that the reason for the final placement of a clause is
often unclear. Amar's interpretive technique leads to serious errors. The
founders did not attach great significance to the location of clauses within
either the Bill of Rights or the unamended Constitution.
Finally, Amar argues that "[p]erhaps the greatest virtue of intratextualism is this: it takes seriously the document as a whole rather than as a
158.

See Articles of Amendment, as Agreed to by the Senate (Sept. 14, 1789), in
supra note 103, at 47, 49.

TARY RECORD,

159.

See supra text accompanying notes 62-73.

160.

See supra text accompanying notes 51-56.
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jumbled grab bag of assorted clauses." 161 Perhaps because Amar (correctly)
sees republican elements in the Bill of Rights, this approach leads him to a
conception of the Bill of Rights as "largely republican and collective, sounding mainly in political rights, in the public liberty of the ancients." 162 But
Section III.C shows that Amar's analysis is at odds with historical reality.
Holistic textualism assumes a degree of ideological coherence that the Bill
of Rights lacks, and Amar stresses collective rights in a way that is inconsistent with the original understanding.
A. Intratextualism
The terms at the heart of Amar's analysis of the Bill of Rights are ''the
people" and, more broadly, "the rights of the people": "The phrase the people appears in no fewer than five of the ten amendments that make up our
Bill of Rights," 163 he observes at one point; "I hope it has not escaped our
notice that no phrase appears in more of the first ten amendments than 'the
people,' " 164 he reminds us at another. Amar declares that "the grand idea of
the original Bill of Rights [is] the rights of the people ...." 165
In analyzing the various uses of "the people" in the Bill of Rights, Amar
employs a mode of analysis that calls to mind dominoes. In the beginning,
literally and analytically, there is the "We the People" of the Preamble,
which guides the interpretation of the First Amendment's "right of the
people peaceably to assemble." 166 "The right of the people to assemble does
not simply protect the ability of self-selected clusters of individuals to meet
together; it is also an express reservation of the collective right of We the
People to assemble in a future convention and exercise our sovereign right
to alter or abolish our govemment," 167 Amar argues: "[O]ur First
Amendment's language of 'the right of the people to assemble' simply made
explicit at the end of the Constitution what [Virginia's Edmund] Pendleton
and others already saw implicit in its opening." 168
Next there is the First Amendment's "ri~ht to petition," which is textually interwoven with the right to assemble. 1 Amar rejects the position that
the right to petition is at its heart a civil right protecting the individual's
right to petition: ''The language and structure of our First Amendment

161.

Amar, lntratextualism, supra note 10, at 795.

162.

AMAR, supra note 8, at 133.

163.

ld. at 112.

164.

/d. at 133.

165.

ld.

166.

U.S.

167.

AMAR, supra note 8, at 26.

168.

/d. at 28.

CONST.

amend. I.

169. The First Amendment recognizes "the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to
petition the Government for a redress of grievances." U.S. CaNST. amend. I.
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suggest otherwise. As with assembly, the core petition right is collective and
popular-it, too, is a right of the people." 170
The interpretation given to the two provisions of the First Amendment
concerning the "right of the people" then guides the construction of the
phrase in the Second Amendment:
[T]he Second Amendment was closely linked to the textually adjoining
First Amendment's guarantees of assembly and petition. One textual tipoff is the use of the magisterial Preamble phrase "the people" in both contexts, thereby conjuring up the Constitution's grand principle of popular
sovereignty and its concomitant popular right to alter or abolish the national government. 171

Part II of this Article discussed how Amar makes similar arguments at
the other end of the Bill of Rights, contending that "[t]he conspicuously
collective meaning of 'the people' in the Tenth Amendment (and elsewhere)
should alert us that its core meaning in the Ninth Amendment is similarly
collective." 172 All of these readings at the beginning and end of the Bill of
Rights converge near the middle to shape the interpretation of "the right of
the people" protected in the Fourth Amendment 173 :
We have already noted that the First and Second Amendments' references
to "the people" implied a core collective right, echoing the Preamble's
commitment to the ultimate sovereignty of "We the People of the United
States." So too with the Ninth and Tenth Amendments' use of that phrase
174

Amar recognizes there is textual evidence that weighs against finding "a
core collective right" in the Fourth Amendment: "[l]n the Fourth Amendment, as nowhere else in the Constitution, the collective-sounding phrase the
people is immediately qualified by the use-twice-of the more individualistic language of persons." 175 Nonetheless, Amar stresses the collective
aspects of the amendment's protections (while recognizing that it also protects individual rights): "As with the First Amendment, the central role of
the jury in the Fourth Amendment should remind us that the core rights of
'the people' were popular and populist rights-rights that the popular body
of the jury was well situated to vindicate." 176 He concludes that "[a]s with
170.

AMAR, supra note 8, at 30.

171.

/d. at47.

172.

ld. at 120.

173.

The Fourth Amendment, in its entirety, reads as follows:

The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable
cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and
the persons or things to be seized.
U.S.

CONST.

174.

amend. IV.

AMAR, supra note 8, at 64.

175.

/d.at67.

176.

ld. at 73.
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virtually every Bill of Rights provision thus far examined, the Fourth
Amendment evinces at least as much concern with the agency problem of
protecting the people generally from self-interested government policy as
with protecting minorities against majorities of fellow citizens." 177
This is an illustration of intratextualism at work. The various references
to "the people" serve to gloss each other. Consistently interpreted, the six
constitutional provisions come to represent a "core collective right." 178 More
broadly, the Bill of Rights comes to embody a coherent vision consistent
with Amar's view that the Constitution is a unified whole and that constitutional interpreters must "take[] seriously the document as a whole rather
than as a jumbled grab bag of assorted clauses." 179
The problem with this approach was revealed in Part II's analysis of the
Ninth and Tenth Amendments. When members of the founding generation
spoke of rights of the people, they may have been referring to collective
rights (since the people possessed such rights), individual rights (since the
people also possessed such rights), or both. Which type of rights the Bill of
Rights protects is contextual. The fact that the "powers ... reserved to the
... people" in the Tenth Amendment are not powers that an individual might
possess does not mean that the "rights ... retained by the people" in the
Ninth Amendment are at their core collective rights rather than individual
rights.
Amar's disregard of this point-his attempt to interpret all usages uniformly-leads him to readings that make no sense as history. He notes with
respect to the Fourth Amendment, for example, that with the exception of
the Pennsylvania Constitution of 1776, in protecting against illegitimate
search and seizures, all of the state constitutions described the right at stake
as a right of a "freeman" or "man," thus indicating that it was an individual
right. 180 Similarly, in seeking an amendment to the federal constitution, state
ratifying conventions formulated the right as an individual right. 181 But
Madison nonetheless opted to frame the Fourth Amendment as protecting a
"right of the people." "Was Madison's use of the phrase 'the people' simply
sloppy draftsmanship," Amar asks, "or is there a way of understanding the
phrase as a collective noun even in the Fourth Amendment?" 182 Amar opts
for the latter choice. 183
Amar's question, however, focuses on two choices, silently excluding
another possibility-that Madison referred to "[t]he right of the people"
because an individual right could be a right of the people. Such an interpretation would be consistent with Madison's commitment to individual liberty.
177.

/d. at 67-68.

178.

/d. at 64.

179.

Amar, lntratextualism, supra note I 0, at 795.

180.

AMAR,

181.

/d.

182.

!d.

183.

Seeid.at65-67.

supra note 8, at 65.
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Amar's account, in contrast, necessarily posits that Madison, despite a
commitment to individual liberty that Amar repeatedly highlights, converted
into a group right a right that virtually everyone-including the
Anti-Federalist-influenced state ratifying conventions-formulated as an
individual right. Amar offers no evidence as to why, when it came to the
Fourth Amendment, Madison might have suddenly become more republican
than virtually anyone else, and it is hard to surmise what that reason might
be.
Precisely the same point can be made with respect to the First Amendment's right to petition. Amar notes that in proposing constitutional
amendments, "each [state ratifying] convention described the right of petition in purely individualistic language-a right of 'every freeman,' 'every
person,' or 'every man.' " 184 Nonetheless, Amar argues that the "language
and structure of our First Amendment suggest ... [that] the core petition
right is collective ... .'' 185 But this reading is not a plausible account of history. As with the Fourth Amendment, Madison formulated the right of
petition as a right of "[t]he people." 186 Again, Amar's reading requires
Madison to have done something directly counter to both Madison's ideology and the popular will.
It is not that an interpreter has nothing to gain by comparing one use of a
word or phrase in the Constitution with other uses of that word or phrase. This
has been standard interpretive practice since at least Chief Justice Marshall's
tenure, and it can certainly be instructive. But intratextualism seeks much
more. According to Amar, the intratextualist treats the Constitution as "dictionary"187 and "concordance." 188 What this seems to mean, based on its
application in The Bill of Rights, is that usages outside of the Constitution
are accorded much less weight than those inside. As a result, Amar overlooks what I highlighted in Part II on the Ninth Amendment: Madison's
original proposal, Sherman's proposal, the proposed amendments, and the
Virginia and New York ratifying conventions' proposed amendments all
used the term "rights" of "the people" to include individual rights. A reader
looking only at the text of the ratified Bill of Rights might, perhaps, plausibly conclude that the rights of "the people" were principally collective
rights, rather than individual rights. But this narrow understanding is belied
by other contemporaneous sources.
The intratextualist notion of constitution as "rulebook"189 "telling us to
construe parallel commands in parallel fashion" 190 then tightens the circle of

184.

ld. at 30.

185.

/d.

186. Madison Resolution, supra note 138, at 12 ("The people shall not be restrained ... from
applying to the legislature by petitions, or remonstrances for redress of their grievances.").
187.

Amar, lntratextualism, supra note 10, at 791.

188.

/d. at 792.

189.

/d. at 795.

190.

/d.
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references even further. The intratextualist starts with a tiny dictionary and
concordance. Because the Constitution is a rulebook, there is a strong presumption that when she encounters words or phrases more than once, they
will have the same meaning. In the case of the rights of the people, this rule
leads to misreadings: the meaning of the phrase is not consistent throughout
the Bill of Rights, and original meaning is at oddr with Amar's interpretation.
How often intratextualism will lead to readings consistent with original
understanding, and how often it will lead to readings at odds with original
understanding, cannot be answered abstractly. But one might expect that
"the rights" of "the people" would be a particularly strong example of
Amar's approach. The term appears repeatedly in a short document, and
Amar has lavished his ingenuity and attention on exploring the term as the
key to explaining the original Bill of Rights. But I have tried to show how
intratextualism-at least with respect to the First Amendment's right to petition, the Fourth Amendment, and the Ninth Amendment-leads to readings
that are at odds with original understanding and thus fails in its goal of recovering that understanding. Amar's own example, then, suggests that
intratextualism is of limited value. It may be (as it long has been) a legitimate, limited canon of construction. But it is too unreliable to merit
inclusion on the standard list of methods for interpreting the Constitution.
As pointed out in the Introduction, Justice Scalia and Justice Thomas
have repeatedly argued that the way a term or word is used in one part of the
Constitution is evidence of what it means in another. Thus in Kelo v. City of
New London, 191 Justice Thomas defines "public use" in the Fifth Amendment's Takings Clause-"nor shall private property be taken for a public
use" 192-by reference to the way in which "use" is employed in limiting
states' ability to tax imports and exports-"the net Produce of all Duties and
Imposts, laid by any State on Imports or Exports, shall be for the Use of the
Treasury of the United States." 193 In his dissent in Morrison v. Olson, 194
Justice Scalia contends that the way the word "inferior" is used in the vesting clause of Article III-''The judicial Power of the United States, shall be
vested in one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress
may from time to time ordain and establish." 195-illuminates the use of the
word "inferior" in the Appointments Clause of Article 11-"[T]he Congress
may by Law vest the appointment of such inferior Officers, as they think
proper, in the President alone, in the Courts of Law, or in the Heads of Departments."196 My study of Amar's treatment of the "rights" of the "people"
shows that this approach-an instance of Amar's intratextualism-is highly

191.

Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469,509-10 (2005) (Thomas, J., dissenting).

192.

U.S. CoNST. amend. V (emphasis added).

193.

/d. art. I, § I 0, cl. 2 (emphasis added).

194.

Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654,719-20 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting).

195.

U.S. CoNST. art. III,§ I (emphasis added).

196.

/d. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 (emphasis added).
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problematic as a guide to original meaning because it privileges a small subset of contemporaneous usages (those in the constitutional document) over
the larger body of relevant contemporaneous usages.

B. Location
In his article on intratextualism, Amar argues for "squeez[ing] meaning
from the Constitution's organization chart." 197 This methodology plays a
critical role in The Bill of Rights, but Amar offers no evidence indicating
that the founders assigned such significance to location. This Article has
shown how this approach leads him astray when interpreting the Ninth
Amendment. 198
This is not an isolated example. Amar repeatedly assumes that location
is a key to meaning in a way belied by the drafting history. Consider his
treatment of the Fifth Amendment's Takings Clause. The clause protects
private property against governmental seizure. 199 Because it protects an individual right to property so unambiguously, it represents the most obvious
challenge to Amar's reading of the Bill of Rights as a republican document.
Amar resEonds by maintaining that Madison "slip[ped] the takings clause
through." 00 He did so "[i]n part by clever bundling, tying the clause to a variety of other provisions that commanded more enthusiasm"201 :
Madison no doubt knew that Article II of the then-recent Northwest Ordinance of 1787 had featured prototypes of the due-process and justcompensation clauses side-by-side. Yet camouflage is not quite compatibility, and on close inspection the takings clause is the odd man out in the
Fifth Amendment-an openly substantive requirement following a string
of procedural rules. 202

Professor Amar repeats the point toward the end of his book: "In 1789,
Madison cleverly packaged [the takings] clause and thus slipped it past a
Congress that was considerably less libertarian than he ...."20
This is incorrect. The claim that Congress somehow overlooked the takings clause is not credible. The Bill of Rights is not so long a document that
a clause would have gone unnoticed. Even more telling, Congress did not
unthinkingly accept Madison's bundling of the clauses in the Fifth Amendment: in fact, it altered it. It is that congressional rebundling that may make

197.

Amar, lntratextualism, supra note 10, at 797 n.l97. For discussion, see supra Section

198.

See supra Section II.B.

LA.
199. The specific language of the Clause follows: "[N]or shall private property be taken for
public use without just compensation." U.S. CoNST. amend. V.

200.

AMAR, supra note 8, at 77.

20 I.

/d. at 78.
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/d.

203.

/d. at 268.
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it appear to a textualist like Amar, who disregards drafting history and focuses on the final product, that the Takings Clause is the "odd man out."
When he proposed the Bill of Rights, Madison envisioned his amendments incorporated into the constitutional text, not appended to the end. 204
And he placed the Double Jeopardy Clause, the Self-Incrimination Clause,
the Due Process Clause, and the Takings Clause in the same amendment.
For clarity, I will refer to this as "Madison's Fifth Amendment." That
amendment was to be one of the amendments placed in Article I, Section 9
between Clause 3 and Clause 4. These amendments would have followed
the Suspension of Habeas Corpus Clause and the Bill of Attainder-Ex Post
Facto Clause of the original Constitution and, like them, were to limit the
205
powers ofc ongress.
The relationship among Madison's Fifth Amendment provisions was
sensible. He had separately grouped (in what ultimately became the Sixth
Amendment) postindictment criminal-process rights. The first three clauses
of Madison's Fifth Amendment held the remaining process rights. 206 The
placement of the Takings Clause-the fourth clause-next to the Due Process Clause, rather than being "camouflage," was natural. The earliest state
constitutions of 1776 and 1777 did not contain takings clauses. To the extent
they placed limits on governmental control of property, those limits were
found in law-of-the-land provisions, the forerunners of the Due Process
Clause. 207 Those provisions contained no substantive limitations, only procedural: private property could not be taken unless authorized by the law of
the land or the judgment of a jury. If such procedures were followed, the
state's authority over private property was unlimited. Thus if the legislature
enacted a statute authorizing the seizure of property without compensation,
the clauses did not bar such seizure.
The takings limitation was an additional restriction on legislative action,
and it was appropriately linked with the due-process (or law-of-the-land)
restriction that it supplemented. Taken as a unit, the two clauses mean the
government can take private property only if it follows appropriate procedures and if it pays compensation. That the Northwest Ordinance "had
featured prototypes of the due-process and just-compensation clauses
204.

See supra Section II.C.

205.

See DocuMENTARY RECORD, supra note 103 at 12.

206. The placement of the Self-Incrimination Clause in what became the Fifth Amendment
rather than in what became the Sixth Amendment reflects the fact that it was not simply a right of a
defendant at his trial: it extended, for example, to witnesses. LEONARD W. LEVY, ORIGINAL INTENT
AND THE FRAMERS' CONSTITUTION 255 (1988).
207. MD. CoNST. of 1776, art. XXI ("That no freeman ought to be taken, or imprisoned, or
disseized of his freehold, liberties, or privileges, or outlawed, or exiled, or in any manner destroyed,
or deprived of his life, liberty, or property, but by the judgment of his peers, or by the law of the
land."), reprinted in 3 THE FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS, COLONIAL CHARTERS, AND
OTHER ORGANIC LAWS OF THE STATES, TERRITORIES, AND COLONIES 1688 (Francis Newton Thorpe
ed., 1909) (hereinafter ORGANIC LAWS]; see also N.Y. CONST. of 1777, art. XIII, reprinted in 5
ORGANIC LAWS, supra, at 2632; N.C. CONST. of 1776, art. XII, reprinted in 5 ORGANIC LAWS, supra, at 2788. For a discussion, see William Michael Treanor, The Original Understanding Of The
Takings Clause And The Political Process, 95 CoLUM. L. REv. 782, 789 & n.40 (1995).
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side-by-side"208 was not happenstance. 209 While Amar suggests that the pairing of the two rights in the Northwest Ordinance was unique, it was not. The
Massachusetts Constitution of 1780--the only one of the original thirteen
state constitutions to have a takings clause before 1789-also placed its dueprocess and takings protections in the same article. 210 Thus, linking dueprocess and takings clauses was natural. 211
Another example of Amar's overemphasis on location is his treatment of
the amendment that was the first on the list of the amendments passed by
Congress and sent to the states. This amendment would have governed the
number of representatives in Congress and would have required that there
initially be one representative in Congress for every thirty thousand people.
It looms large in Amar's analysis. He entitles his first chapter "First Things
First" and begins his substantive discussion of the provisions of the Bill of
Rights by "considering two Rrovisions that are not part of our Bill of Rights,
but were part of Madison's" 12 :
This would-be First Amendment obviously sounds primarily in structure
.... Had this original First Amendment prevailed in the state-ratification
process ... it would no doubt be much harder for twentieth-century citizens and scholars to ignore the Bill of Rights' emphasis on structure, for
the Bill would begin and end with structural provisions .... It is poetic that
this amendment was first, for it responded to perhaps the single most important concern of the Anti-Federalists.m

The Anti-Federalists attached great importance to this amendment, which
Professor Amar emphasizes by showing that five of the six states proposing
amendments sought one fixing a minimum size for the House of Representatives. "This proposal," he tells us, "was never placed lower than second on
an ordinarily long list of desired amendments. Only one principle ever
ranked higher-the idea of limited federal power that eventually made its
way into our Tenth (their Twelfth) Amendment."214
208.

AMAR, supra note 8, at 78.

209.

The fourth sentence of Article II of the Ordinance reads as follows:

No man shall be deprived of his liberty or property but by the judgment of his peers, or the law
of the land, and should the public exigencies make it necessary for the common preservation to
take any person's property, or to demand his particular services, full compensation shall be
made for the same.
Northwest Ordinance of 1787, I Stat. 50, 51 n.(a), art. II (1789), reprinted in I DocuMENTARY
HISTORY, supra note 131, at 397,400.
210. MASS. DEC. OF RIGHTS of 1780, art. X, reprinted in I DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra
note 131, at 339,341-42.
211. The Declaration of Rights in the Vermont Constitution of 1777 did not link the Takings
Clause and its version of the Due Process clause. See VT. CONST. of 1777, ch. I,§§ II, IX (takings
and due process clauses), reprinted in I DocuMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 131, at 319, 322-23.
The point is not that the linkage was inevitable but that it was commonplace, as the structure of the
Massachusetts Constitution and the Northwest Ordinance suggest.
212.

AMAR, supra note 8, at 8.

213.
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The legislative history, however, does not indicate that the founding
generation thought Congress's First Amendment was a "first thing" that
should be put "first." To begin, this was Madison's Second Amendment:
Madison's First Amendment would have been a new preamble to the Constitution. 215 Amar discusses (in part) the proposed amendment to the preamble
later in the book, but it is not mentioned in the first chapter, where Madison's
Second Amendment is referred to as Madison's First Amendment. 216
Madison's Second Amendment, which became Congress's First Amendment,
appeared second on his list because his ordering tracked the location in the
Constitution where the amendments were to be inserted. Thus Madison's Second Amendment was to be inserted into Article I, Section 2, Clause 3, the
clause governing the number of representatives and the states they were to
represent (and regulating the power to collect direct taxes). 217 It was the second location in the Constitution (after the preamble) where Madison wanted
the text amended, and so the new text to be inserted there appeared as his second amendment. The House rejected Madison's amendment to the preamble,
and it decided to append the amendments to the end of the Constitution. 218
Thus Madison's Second Amendment became Congress's First Amendment by
a process that reflected neither a sense that it was preeminent nor that its
placement was particularly significant.
Nor does Amar offer any historical evidence to support his view that the
order in which the states listed proposed amendments corresponded to their
sense of the amendments' importance. 219 It should be noted that in proposing
amendments, the states for the most part shared Madison's intent that they
be inserted into the constitutional text. 220 As Congressman Benson observed
in arguing for Madison's plan to incorporate the amendments into the text,
Madison's "decision was founded in a great degree upon the recommendation of the state conventions, who had proposed amendments in this very
form." 221 Given that Madison proposed his amendments in order of where
they should go in the constitutional text, one might suspect that this is also
what the states did. This would suggest that the amendment concerning representation "was never placed lower than second on an ordinarily long list of
215.

See Madison Resolution, supra note 138, at II.

216.

AMAR, supra note 8, at 17.

217.

See Madison Resolution, supra note 138, at 12.

218.

See House Resolution and Articles of Amendment, supra note 156, at 37-41.

219. The only support of any type that Amar offers is a reference to a Jaw review article that,
in discussing free speech and press, does exactly what Professor Amar does: notes the placement of
the protection in various documents and assumes, without support, that placement reflects significance. See AMAR, supra note 8, at 316 n.42 (citing David A. Anderson, The Origins of the Press
Clause, 30 UCLA L. REv. 455, 482 (1983)).
220. Virginia proposed both amendments to the text and a bill of rights. Amendments Proposed by the Virginia Convention, supra note 123, at 17-21. New York had a list of rights that it
declared could not be abridged, a list of understandings, and a list of proposed amendments.
Amendments Proposed by the New York Convention, supra note 129, at 21-28.
221. CONG. REG., Aug. 13, 1789, reprinted in DocUMENTARY RECORD, supra note 103, at
112, 123.
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desired amendments"222 for the same reason it was second on Madison's list:
it amended a clause near the beginning of the Constitution.
A look at state proposals suggests that tracking the Constitution was
probably the basic (though not invariant) principle employed as states assembled their lists. Massachusetts, for example, the first state to propose
amendments, had nine. If one assumes their first proposed amendment (the
prototype of our Tenth Amendment) was conceived as either an amendment
to the preamble or a clause to be inserted at the start of Article I, these
amendments track the order of the constitutional text with the exception that
the three clauses concerning courts or juries (proposals six, seven, and eight)
are sensibly clustered together rather than divided between Article I, Section
9, Clause 3 and Article 3, Section 2 as Madison had done. 223 New Hampshire,
the next state to propose a clause concerning representation, also placed that
clause second, and it did so for a fairly straightforward reason: it adopted the
Massachusetts amendments essentially word for word. It then added three
224
amendments at the end to make a total of twelve. These texts suggest that
Professor Amar's assumption that the states listed their proposed amendments
in order of importance is incorrect.
The only hint Amar gives in his opening chapter as to why Congress's
First Amendment was listed first appears in a footnote following this sentence: "It is poetic that this amendment was first, for it responded to perhaps
the single most important concern of the Anti-Federalists." 225 The footnote
suggests an alternative interpretation: "For a less poetic and more prosaic
reason for the 'firstness' of the original First Amendment, see Chapter 2." 226
In that chapter, Professor Amar informs the reader that Madison intended
that his amendments be inserted into the constitutional text and that their
order tracked their would-be placement. 227 But this point receives relatively
little development, and Professor Amar makes no effort to link it back to his
extended discussion of Congress's First Amendment in the previous chapter,
even though it directly undercuts his thesis of that amendment's "firstness."
Location can be a helpful guide to original meaning. In Part II, I sought
to show how analyzing Madison's original proposal reveals that the provision that eventually became the Ninth Amendment was intended to gloss
rights provisions that preceded it (rather than being linked with the Tenth
Amendment that eventually came to follow it, as Amar argues). 228 In the next
Section, I will argue that the relationship between the Due Process Clause
and the Grand Jury Clause is better understood when it is recognized that
222.

AMAR, supra note 8, at 14.

223. Amendments Proposed by the Massachusetts Convention (Feb. 6, 1788), in DocuMENTARY RECORD, supra note 103, at 14, 14-15.
224. Amendments Proposed by the New Hampshire Convention (June 21, 1788), in DocuMENTARY RECORD, supra note 103, at 16, 16-17.
225.

AMAR, supra note 8, at 9.

226.

/d.

227.

!d. at 37.

228.

See supra Section II. B.
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Madison wanted them inserted into different parts of the Constitution (a
point Amar fails to recognize). Understanding the significance of location
requires examining how the document was produced and discovering the
interpretive assumptions that animated its drafters. Amar simply examines
the document itself and imposes his own interpretive assumptions on the
document.
Some of the readings his technique produces are fascinating, but that
does not mean that they are consistent with the original understanding. For
example, although he attaches no significance to it, Amar compares the
Fourteenth Article of the Bill of Rights as it emerged from the House with
the Fourteenth Amendment of our Constitution. When the House concluded
its work, Madison's proposal to guarantee individual rights against state
governments-"No state shall violate the equal rights of conscience, or the
freedom of the press, or the trial by jury in criminal cases" 229-had been
expanded in scope to include free speech and placed as the Fourteenth Article in the proposal it sent the Senate: "No State shall infringe the right of
trial by Jury in criminal cases, nor the rights of conscience, nor the freedom
of speech, or of the press."230 (The Senate rejected the proposal.) 231 Amar
refers to the House's Fourteenth Article as "its prophetically numbered
Fourteenth Amendment" 232 and as the "presciently numbered Fourteenth."233
While Amar does not, in fact, assign any significance to this coincidence,
the happenstance illustrates how someone of Amar's creativity could find
links that have nothing to do with the original understanding. His similar
fixation on location, analyzed without regard to legislative history, leads him
astray.
The larger point here is that the founding generation did not assign a
great deal of significance to placement. The way the Bill of Rights evolved
reflects this fact. Unlike Amar, no one at the time the Bill of Rights was
adopted assigned a great deal of significance to which amendment might be
first, and they did not think it relevant which amendments were next to each
other.
A similar point can be made about the unamended Constitution. In The
Document and the Doctrine, Professor Amar derives great significance from
the Constitution's "large[] organizing schemas":
Each of the three great departments-legislative, executive, judicial-is
given its own separate article, introduced by a separate vesting clause. To
read these three vesting clauses as an ensemble (as their conspicuously
parallel language and parallel placement would seem to invite) is to see a
plain statement of separated powers. 234

229.

Madison Resolution, supra note 138, at 13.

230.

House Resolution and Articles of Amendment, supra note 156, at 41.

231.

DOCUMENTARY RECORD, supra note 103, at 41 n.J4.

232.

AMAR, supra note 8, at 22.

233.

/d. at 38.

234.

Amar, supra note I, at 30.
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While the Supreme Court has not yet adopted Amar's stress on location
and style, other scholars have adopted approaches that accord with Amar's.
In an article of great influence, Steven Calabresi and Saikrishna Prakash, the
leading academic proponents of the unitary executive theory, 235 have offered
a comparison of the vesting clauses for each of the three branches as support
for their argument that the President alone has the power to control execution of all federal laws:
There are many reasons why the Vesting Clause of Article II must be read
as conferring a general grant of the "executive Power"-a grant that is in
tum defined and limited by the later enumerations in Article II, Section 2.
To begin with, the Clause is linguistically and structurally similar to the
Vesting Clause of Article III (and different from the Vesting Clause of Article 1). The Vesting Clauses of Articles II and III contain nearly identical
language in parallel grammatical formulations. Both omit the "herein
granted" qualification that appears in the Vesting Clause of Article I, and
both confer general grants of power (executive or judicial) on federal governmental entities that are then defined and limited by later provisions of
Articles II and III. 236

This basic constitutional structure was not, however, the subject of debate at the Philadelphia convention. When the draft of the Constitution went
to the Committee of Style and Arrangement for polishing at the end of the
Convention's proceedings, the legislative power was the subject of Articles
Three through Nine, the executive power was the subject of Article Ten, the
judicial power was the subject of Article Eleven (along with the habeas corpus provision), and the limitations on state power were in Articles Twelve
and Thirteen. 237
As its name suggests, the Committee of Style and Arrangement was not
supposed to be concerned with substance. From the complex structure of the
prior draft, the Committee created the three-article structure (with the habeas-corpus provision and the limits on the power of the states inserted in
Article I) with which we are all familiar today. 238 It also added the "herein
granted" language to the vesting clause of Article I, language which supporters of the unitary executive find a powerful limit on congressional
authority. 239 This dramatic restructuring of the document was not debated on

235.

See MartinS. Flaherty, The Most Dangerous Branch, 105 YALE L.J. 1725, 1743 (1996).

236. Steven G. Calabresi & Saikrishna B. Prakash, The President's Power To Execute the
Laws, 104 YALE L.J. 541, 570-71 (1994) (footnote and emphasis omitted); see also Vikram David
Amar, Jury Service as Political Participation Akin to Voting, 80 CoRNELL L. REv. 203, 222-46
(1995) (providing an intratextual analysis of voting amendments); Steven G. Calabresi & Kevin H.
Rhodes, The Structural Constitution: Unitary Executive, Plural Judiciary, 105 HARV. L. REv. 1153,
1175-86 (1992) (providing an intratextual analysis of vesting clauses).
237. See Proceedings of the Convention Referred to the Committee of Style and Arrangement
( 1787), in 2 RECORDS, supra note I 04, at 565-80.
238.

For the Report of the Committee of Style, see 2 RECORDS, supra note 104, at 590-603.

239. See Calabresi & Prakash, supra note 236, at 563,570-71,574-75 (assigning significance
to the fact that the vesting clause of Article I gives Congress the legislative powers "herein granted,"
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the convention floor. 240 The changes were considered stylistic rather than of
great interpretive consequence.
Thus both the legislative history of the Bill of Rights and the unamended
Constitution indicate that to the limited extent that location is relevant to
original meaning, the significance of location can be assessed only by close
study of drafting history. Amar and other close-reading textualist scholars
depart from the framework of the founding generation when they think that
simply by looking at the placement of clauses in the Constitution, they can
recapture original meaning.
C. Substantive Coherence
Again and again in his analysis of the Bill of Rights, Amar stresses
collective rights and undervalues individual rights. Guiding this approach is
his premise that the Constitution is substantively coherent, a premise he
developed most fully in his article Intratextualism. This approach requires
the Bill of Rights to be about something, to have "a grand idea." That grand
idea, Amar argues, is "the rights of the people." In turn, "the core rights of
'the people' were popular and populist rights ...." 241 The Bill of Rights was
fundamentally "an Anti-Federalist idea that moderate Federalists ultimately
accepted and adjusted."242 This approach misses both that individual rights
were important to framers of the Bill of Rights and that the Bill of Rights
itself sought to protect both group rights and individual rights against the
national government.
In this Article, I have challenged Amar's account of the Ninth Amendment, and I have argued that he misreads the First Amendment's right to
petition and the Fourth Amendment. This Section begins by looking at two
further examples of how Amar minimizes the role of individual rights in the
Bill of Rights and elevates collective rights in a way that is inconsistent with
the original understanding of the relevant clauses. Amar discounts the Due
Process Clause and reads too much into the various jury clauses of the Bill
of Rights (which, like the Ninth Amendment, Amar treats as important evidence supporting his thesis). These are further examples of how Amar's
search for a "grand idea" consistently leads him away from the Bill of
Right's multifaceted original meaning.
Amar's Bill of Rights makes an important contribution to our thinking
about the document by highlighting its republican and collective aspects.
But Amar focuses on this republican dimension and minimizes the liberal,
individual-rights dimension that was of much greater concern to the founders. The narrative Amar offers to situate the Bill of Rights in a political
context-supposedly reflecting the Anti-Federalist vision-is wrong. The
whereas the vesting clauses of Articles n and III simply grant the Executive and the Courts the
"executive Power" and the "judicial Power" without limitation).

240.

For the debate on the Committee's work, see 2 REcoRDS, supra note 104, at 607-40.

241.

AMAR,

242.

ld. at 302.

supra note 8, at 73.
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Anti-Federalists were, in fact, unhappy with the Bill of Rights. Finally, this
Section argues that Amar's premise of "substantive coherence" misses the
messiness of historical reality.
Amar's treatment of the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause illustrates how Amar's search for substantive coherence leads him to disregard
evidence that does not fit his overall vision. The words of the clause reflect a
concern with the protection of individual rights: "[N]or shall any person ...
be deprived of life, liberty, or property." 243 In his reading of the Bill of
Rights, however, Amar limits his discussion of the clause to a sentence and a
supporting textual footnote and, without acknowledging any paradox, offers
the clause as support for his thesis of the centrality of collective rights in the
Bill of Rights.
Amar discusses the Due Process Clause while arguing that juries should
be viewed as republican decision makers: "The Fifth Amendment dueprocess clause implicated the jury even more directly [than the non-jury
clauses of the Sixth Amendment], for its core meaning was to require lawful
indictment or presentment by a grand jury."244 He concludes his paragraph
on the Due Process Clause and the nonjury clauses of the Sixth Amendment:
"The jury summed up-indeed embodied-the ideals of populism, federalism, and civic virtue that were the essence of the original Bill of Rights." 245
Amar's contention about the "core meaning" of the Due Process Clause
is a surprising claim for a textualist to make, particularly surprising for a
holistic textualist who seeks the relationship between constitutional clauses.
Amar is asking us to read the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause as
having a "core meaning" that simply restates the Fifth Amendment's Grand
Jury Clause, a point he seems to acknowledge in a very oblique way in his
footnote on the Due Process Clause. 246 Since a textualist strongly presumes
that each word in the Constitution has meaning rather than being surplusage,
this apparent repetition logically leads to the question, why did the founders
include a Due Process Clause? Amar does not address the issue, but the only
rationale I can think of that he might offer would be that the Due Process
Clause had some meaning at its "periphery"-some meaning other than protection of the grand-jury right-that led to its inclusion in the Bill of Rights.
But if that were the case, then the meaning at the periphery would necessarily be a core meaning because it would be the reason for the inclusion of the
clause in the first place. From a purely textualist viewpoint, then, Amar's
contention about the core meaning of the clause does not hold together.
243.

U.S. CoNST. amend. V (emphasis added).

244.

AMAR, supra note 8, at 97.

245.

/d.

246. He writes: "Here, as elsewhere, I do not argue that the clause cannot be applied beyond
what I call its 'core' meaning. Indeed, refusal to do so here would render the provision wholly redundant, as the Supreme Court has noted." !d. at 342 n.62 (citing Murray's Lessee v. Hoboken Land
and Improvement Co., 59 U.S. (18 How.) 272, 276 (1856)). Amar does not actually spell out what
the redundancy is. Several chapters later, however, in discussing the meaning of due process in
1866, he observes "[t]here are also questions about redundancy if we assume that the Fifth Amendment's due-process clause merely replicated its grand-jury clause." /d. at 202.
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If Amar were offering such a hard-to-justify core meaning, one would
expect him to do so on the basis of strong originalist evidence. But his evidence is slight, and the sources he cites on do not actually support his
reading. Amar relies on Alexander Hamilton, Justice Story, and Chancellor
Kent in support of his proposition that the "core meaning [of due process]
was to require lawful indictment or presentment by a grand jury."247 But in
each of the three statements Amar cites, the author is referring to Lord
Coke's definition of due process. These sources suggest that Lord Coke believed the core meaning of due process involved the grand jury, but they
undercut Amar's claim that the conception of due process was similarly limited in the late-eighteenth-century United States.
Amar quotes from Hamilton's 1784 Letter from Phocion: "If we enquire
what is meant by the law of the land, the best commentators will tell us, that it
means due process of law, that is, by indictment or presentment of good and
lawful men,* and trial and conviction in consequence."248 The italicization
and asterisk, which are in Hamilton's original letter, reflect the fact that
Hamilton was quoting Coke, as Amar notes. 249 Hamilton was not suggesting
that Coke's definition reflected the core meaning of the clause. Indeed,
Hamilton added the phrase "and trial and conviction in consequence" to
Coke's definition because he did not believe the phrase was limited in the
. d'tcate d.250
way Coke m
In the Letter from Phocion, Hamilton is attacking state legislation that
disfranchised and banished loyalists. Contrary to what Amar's analysis
would suggest, Hamilton clearly views the core violation as legislation that
led to the denial of a trial, not the fact that punishment was not preceded by
an indictment. 251
Amar's cites Story in this discussion but does not quote him. 252 Amar
does quote from the relevant section of Story's Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States in his discussion of due process in the context of
the Fourteenth Amendment: "Lord Coke says, that [the words by the law of
the land] mean by due process of law, [which in turn means] due presentment or indictment, and being brought in to answer thereto by due process

247.

/d. at 97, 342 n.62.

248. /d. The full quote is from Alexander Hamilton, A Letter from Phocion to the Considerate
Citizen of New York, reprinted in 3 THE PAPERS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON 485 (Harold C. Syrett
and Jacob E. Cooke eds., 1962).
249.

/d.

250.

See Hamilton, supra note 248, at 485.

251. See, e.g., id. at 484 ("[T]hese men are advocates for expelling a large number of their
fellow-citizens unheard, untried; or, if they cannot effect this, are for disfranchising them, in the
face of the constitution, without the judgment of their peers, and contrary to the law of the land."
(emphasis added)); id. at 485 ("[T]he legislature ... cannot, without tyranny, disfranchise or punish
whole classes of citizens by general discriptions, without trial and conviction of offences known by
laws previously established declaring the offence and prescribing the penalty. This is a dictate of
natural justice, and a fundamental principle of law and liberty." (emphasis added)).
252.

AMAR, supra note 8, at 342 n.62.
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of the common law." 253 Story, like Hamilton, is referring to the whole legal
process, not simply to the initiation of it by the grand jury. Amar recognizes
this in his discussion of the Fourteenth Amendment (although not in his discussion of the Fifth Amendment): "We need not say that due process in
1866 meant nothing more than grand juries-Story and Stewart [an antislavery writer] seemed to read the clause more sweepingly ...." 254 There is
no basis here for the argument that the right to presentment or indictment is
the core meaning of the Due Process Clause.
The passage from Chancellor Kent that Amar cites is one in which Kent
discusses English usage. It is quoted in Amar's later discussion of Fourteenth Amendment due process: "The words by the law of the land as used
in magna charta ... are understood to mean due process of law, that is, by
indictment or presentment of good and lawful men; and this, says Lord
Coke, is the true sense and exposition of those words." 255 As Amar notes in a
parenthetical, Kent is "parroting Coke's definition of due process" 256 : the
passage does not reflect Kent's understanding of the phrases "law of the
land" and "due process." In fact as chancellor, Kent played a critical role in
the expansion of the concept of due process to include protection of vested
rights. 257 In the important case of Gardner v. Trustees of Newburgh, 258 decided well before Kent wrote his treatise, the chancellor invalidated a statute
that allowed municipal trustees to block a stream that had previously flowed
onto plaintiff's property:
A right to a stream of water is as sacred as a right to the soil over which it
flows. It is a part of the freehold of which no man can be disseised "but by
lawful judgment of his peers, or by due process of law." This is an ancient
and fundamental maxim of common right to be found in magna charta,
and which the legislature has incorporated into an act declaratory of the
rights of the citizens of this state. 259

The case involved a civil statute and had nothing to do with the grand-jury
right that, according to Amar, Kent thought was at the core of due process.
But there is no sense in the opinion that Kent thought he was operating at
the periphery of due process. Rather, he refers to the right he is protecting as
"sacred."
Amar does not mention the early state case law that, by applying law-ofthe-land provisions to the review of civil legislation, cuts against his argu-

253. /d. at 200--01 (quoting 3 JosEPH STORY, CoMMENTARIES ON THE CoNSTITUTION OF THE
UNITED STATES§ 1783, at 661 (1833)).
254.

/d. at 2C I.

255. /d. at 200--01 (quoting 2 JAMES KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW J3 (2d ed.
1832)) (omission in original).
256.

/d. at 342 n.62.

257. James W. Ely, Jr., The Oxymoron Reconsidered: Myth and Reality in the Origins of Substantive Due Process, 16 CaNST. CoMMENT 315, 334 (1999).
258.

2 Johns. Ch. 162 (N.Y. Ch. 1816).

259.

Gardner, 2 Johns. Ch., at 165-{i6.
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ment about the limited meaning of the Due Process Clause. 260 Nor does he
mention a critical piece of evidence indicating that the Grand Jury Clause
and Due Process Clause had different areas of focus: in Madison's original
proposal, the Due Process Clause was to be inserted into Article I while the
Grand Jury Clause was to be inserted into Article III, but the Senate added
the Grand Jury Clause to what became the Fifth Amendment only after it
had stricken the clauses to which the Grand Jury Clause had originally been
attached. 261 This history suggests that the Due Process Clause was concerned
with a broad range of process rights rather than being focused on the grandjury right.
The misreading of the Due Process Clause is understandable, however,
because it is driven by Amar's premise that the Bill of Rights had one grand
idea: collective rights. His narrow conception of the Due Process Clause is a
prerequisite to thinking about it as a collective right. If due process at its
core implicates a range of process rights, its focus is logically the individual
whose interests are protected. By asserting that the core meaning of the
clause concerns grand juries, and by treating the Due Process Clause only in
the context of his analysis of the importance of juries as community decision makers, Amar reads the Due Process Clause as if it involved simply the
grand jury's right to decide. But even accepting Amar's assertion that the
Due Process Clause is at its core about indictment and presentment, it is still
the individual's right, not the community's right. That is clear from its text,
and Amar offers no evidence that would indicate it should not be so viewed.
By giving the Due Process Clause such strikingly short shrift-one sentence
of text in the six chapters on the original understanding of the Bill of
Rights-by limiting its focus, and by folding it into his discussion of "[t]he
[c]entrality of the [j]ury," 262 Amar fails to confront important evidence that
works against his claims.
Amar's search for a grand idea underlying the Bill of Rights also leads
him to misunderstand the jury clauses by significantly understating the extent to which they protect individual rights. Amar all but ignores the Due
Process Clause and places juries at the center of his analysis: "Juries, guaranteed in no fewer than three amendments, were at the heart of the Bill of
Rights." 263 His chapter on juries is the longest chapter in the half of his book
260. E.g., Den on demise of the Trs. of the Univ. of N.C. v. Foy, 5 N.C. (I Mur.) 58 (1805);
State v. - - , 2 N.C. 38 (I Hayw.) 28 (1794); Lindsay v. Comm'rs, 2 S.C.L. (2 Bay) 38 (S.C.
1796); Bowman v. Middleton, I S.C.L. (I Bay) 252 (S.C. 1792). On the equivalency of "law of the
land" and "due process" in English usage, see 2 DocUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 131, at 85556.
261. See DocuMENTARY RECORD, supra note 103 at 12 (providing Madison's original proposal); id. at 39-40 (Article X of House Resolution and Articles of Amendment of August 24, 1789;
Article X contained grand jury clause and other criminal procedure protections); id. at 40 & n.14
(observing that on September 4, 1789 the Senate rejected all of Article X except for the grand jury
clause and that on September 8, 1789, the Senate merged the grand jury clause into Article VIII).
Article VIII was the precursor of our Fifth Amendment. See id. at 39 (providing Article VID as
adopted by the House of Representatives).
262.

AMAR, supra note 8, at 96.

263.

ld. at 83.
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devoted to the founders' Bill of Rights. 264 To Professor Amar, the jury is
above all an institution of popular rule, the mechanism by which the people
decide: "[l]t is anachronistic to see jury trial as an issue of individual right
rather than (also, and more fundamentally) a question of government structure."265 Thus if the founders' vision is to be honored, the defendant cannot
waive his right to a jury because the fundamental commitment of the Bill of
Rights is to the community's right to judge, not to the individual's right to
be judged by the community. 266
Professor Amar's convincingly makes the case that the jury right was
traditionally a right of the community as well as a right of the individual,
and his view here accords with the historical scholarship. Thus Forrest
McDonald has argued that Anti-Federalists championed a vision of the
United States as "a nation composed of several thousand insular communities, each of which exercised virtually absolute powers over its members
through two traditional institutions, the militias and the juries." 267 Robert
Palmer has written similarly that "jury trial was a better means for maintaining local communal standards than for protecting individualliberties." 268
But Amar misses the rethinking of the jury's role that was already underway in the revolutionary era. 269 There was less reason to stress the jury as
the defender of the people against the government when the people began to
elect their government postindependence. For the first time, the jury became
important as a check on majoritarian abuse of individual rights. It is significant in this regard that the judicial-review cases of the revolutionary era for
the most part involved individuals from unpopular groups-loyalists and
creditors-who challenged statutes that took away their right to a jury
trial. 270 These individuals sought jury trials not because they thought the
community was favorable to them but because they wanted an avenue to
challenge hostile legislative decision making.
The 1787 North Carolina Supreme Court decision Bayard v. Singleton 271
supports this view of the right to a jury trial as an individual right. The court
there invalidated a state statute that denied a jury trial to loyalists who chal264.

See id. at 81-118.

265.

/d. at 104 (emphasis added).

266.

/d. at 104-10.

267.

McDoNALD, supra note 104, at 289.

268. Robert C. Palmer, Liberties as Constitutional Provisions, in LIBERTY AND CoMMUNITY:
CONSTITUTION AND RIGHTS IN THE EARLY AMERICAN REPUBLIC 55, !OJ (1987); see also WILLIAM
E. NELSON, AMERICANIZATION OF THE COMMON LAW: THE IMPACT OF LEGAL CHANGE ON
MASSACHUSETTS SociETY, 1760-1830, at 20-30 (1975); RAKOVE, supra note 36, at 297-302.
269. See AMAR, supra note 8, at 110 (noting continuity of view of role of the jury during
revolutionary era).
270. See Treanor, supra note 7, at 474-87. In addition, Virginia's first instance of judicial
review-the Case of the Prisoners-was also concerned with legislation affecting loyalists, although the legislation implicated was a pardon statute, rather than a statute affecting the right to a
jury trial. See William Michael Treanor, The Case of the Prisoners and the Origins of Judicial Review, 143 U. PA. L. REV. 491 (1994).
271.

I N.C. (Mart.) 5 ( 1787).
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lenged the confiscation of their property. In announcing its holding, the
court spoke in the unmistakable vocabulary of individual liberty:
[B]y the constitution every citizen had undoubtedly a right to a decision of
his property by a trial by jury. For that if the Legislature could take away
this right, and require him to stand condemned in his property without a
trial, it might with as much authority require his life to be taken away
without a trial by jury, and that he should stand condemned to die, without
the formality of any trial at all .... 212

Consistent with this vision, the two jury clauses of the Bill of Rights that
pertain to the criminal process are framed as individual rights. The Fifth
Amendment provides that "[n]o person shall be held to answer for a capital,
or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a
Grand Jury, except in cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in actual service in time of War or public danger ...."273 The Sixth
Amendment provides that "[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall
enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State
and district wherein the crime shall have been committed ...."274 Only the
Seventh Amendment's right to a civil jury trial is not explicitly framed as an
individual right. But nor is it framed as a collective right:
In Suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed
twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved, and no fact tried
by a jury shall be otherwise re-examined in any Court of the United States,
than according to the rules of the common law. 275

Several state proposals present the civil jury trial right as a waivable individual right. Massachusetts sought the following amendment: "In civil
actions between Citizens of different States every issue of fact arising in
Actions at common law shall be tried by a Jury if the parties or either of
them request it."276 Roger Sherman's proposal was to the same effect: a right
to jury trial in civil cases existed "if either party, request it." 277 This legislative history suggests that the right to a civil jury trial, like the other two jury
rights, was fundamentally understood as an individual right.
The point here is not that the notion of jury as republican decision maker
had disappeared by 1791, for it had not. I am contesting Amar's claim that
jury trial was "more fundamentallr ... a question of government structure" than an "individual right."27 A basic premise underlying Amar's
272.

/d. at 7.

273.

U.S. CoNST. amend. V (emphasis added).

274.

ld. amend. VI (emphasis added).

275.

ld. amend. VII.

276. Amendments Proposed by the Massachusetts Convention, supra note 223, at 15. The
Maryland Minority proposal and the New Hampshire proposal were also framed in terms of a waivable individual right. See THE COMPLETE BILL OF RIGHTS: THE DRAFTS, DEBATES, SOURCES, AND
ORIGINS 506-07 (Neil H. Cogan ed., 1997) (reproducing proposals).
277.

Sherman, supra note 146, at 267.

278.

AMAR, supra note 8, at 104 (emphasis added).

Michigan Law Review

538

[Vol. 106:487

textualism-that precise word choice is evidence of original understanding-is correct (although it does not provide evidence as strong as Amar
generally claims). The word choice reflected in the text of the Fifth and
Sixth Amendment indicates that the right to a grand jury and to a jury trial
were more fundamentally concerned with individual rights than with governmental structure. The legislative history of the Seventh Amendment
suggests the same result.
There is a republican element of the Bill of Rights. 279 Amar effectively
argues that the Tenth Amendment's reservation of "powers ... to the people"280 refers to powers that the people collectively hold, 281 that the First
Amendment's right of the people to assemble is primarily a collective
right, 282 and that the Second Amendment's "core concerns are populism and
federalism." 283 And concerns about community rights could reinforce concerns about individual rights, as jury-trial rights did. But Amar pushes
beyond these points, and his search for a grand theme behind the Bill of
Rights leads him to misinterpret constitutional provisions and downplay
evidence inconsistent with his theme.
Perhaps no constitutional document can be substantively coherent if
produced in a majoritarian fashion by participants with dramatically different interests. But at the very least, the Bill of Rights fails to cohere in the
way Amar would have it cohere. Amar suggests that republicanism was the
dominant ideology at the time of the Bill of Rights and that it guided the
construction of the Bill of Rights; the true picture is more complex, as historian Isaac Kramnick has observed:
Federalists and Antifederalists ... tapped several languages of politics ....
None dominated the field, and the use of one was compatible with the use
of another by the same writer or speaker. There was a profusion and confusion of political tongues among the founders. They lived easily with that
clatter; it is we, two hundred and more years later, who chafe at their inconsistency. 2114

Drawing on the work of Claude Levi-Strauss, Mark Tushnet has used the
term "bricolage"-"the assembly of something new from whatever materials the constructors discovered" 285-to describe the founders' approach as
they put together the Constitution, and the metaphor is an apt one. The Bill
of Rights embraces both collective rights and individual rights.
279. Robert Palmer has provided a thoughtful analysis of the relationship between republicanism and the Bill of Rights that, unlike Amar's account, treats republicanism as fundamentally
concerned with the protection of individual liberty. See Palmer, supra note 268, at 105-117.
280.
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But to the extent that one type of right was ascendant, it was individual
rights. Amar's account of the revolutionary era is a static one. He misses the
fact that during the revolutionary era, in response to assertions of state legislative authority that they deemed unjust, many Americans came to rethink
the belief that majorities could be relied on to protect individual rights:
Americans entered the Revolutionary crisis confident that they knew what
their rights were; after independence, they modified these ideas only modestly. What did evolve, far more dramatically and creatively, were their
ideas of where the dangers to rights lay and of how rights were to be protected. At the outset American believed that arbitrary acts of the Crown
and its colonial officials, including judges of the higher courts, posed the
greatest threat, and they accordingly treated the rights of representation
and trial by jury as their chief securities against arbitrary rule. It took a
decade of experience under the state constitutions to expose the triple danger that so alarmed Madison in 1787: first, that the abuse of the legislative
power was more ominous than arbitrary acts of the executive; second, that
the true problem of rights was less to protect the ruled from their rulers
than to defend minorities and individuals against factious popular majorities acting through government; and third, that agencies of central
government were less dangerous than state and local despotisms. This
reconception marked a significant departure in Anglo-American thinking
about rights, and it helps to explain why Federalist qualms about the utility
of bills of rights involved more than political oversight. 286

Similarly, Gordon Wood has observed that "[i]n 1776 the solution to the
problems of American politics seemed to rest not so much in emphasizing
the private rights of individuals against the general will as it did in stressing
the public rights of the collective people against the supposed privileged
interests of their rulers." 287 By the end of the revolutionary era, thinking
about rights had undergone a transformation:
The liberty that was now emphasized was personal or private, the protection of individual rights against all governmental encroachments,
particularly by the legislature, the body which the Whigs had traditionally
cherished as the people's exclusive repository of their public liberty and
the surest weapon to defend their private liberties. 288

If Amar's account explained such evidence, the fact that it differs from that
of leading historians such as Wood and Rakove would not matter. But in
critical ways it does not explain such evidence, as my discussion of particular clauses has sought to show.
At a broader level, Amar's account is also at odds with the ways in
which the founders themselves understood the Bill of Rights. Madison's
notes for his speech introducing the Bill of Rights and the newspaper accounts of that speech show that he understood and defended the Bill of
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Rights as fundamentally concerned with the protection of individual rights
against majorities. According to his notes, the amendments "relate 1st. to
private rights."289 He adds that the amendments will "guard 1. vs Executive
... 2. Legislature as in Sts-... 3. Majority of people."290 The newspaper
account of the speech confirms that understanding:
[I]n a government modified like this of the United States, the great danger
lies rather in the abuse of the community than in the legislative body. The
prescriptions in favor of liberty, ought to be leveled against that quarter
where the greatest danger lies, namely, that which possesses the highest
prerogative of power: But this is not found in either the executive or legislative departments of government, but in the body of the people, operating
by the majority against the minority. 291

Leading Anti-Federalists shared Madison's understanding of the Bill of
Rights as primarily protective of individual rights. Where Amar contends
that the Bill of Rights was "an Anti-Federalist idea that moderate Federalists
ultimately accepted and adjusted,"292 the Anti-Federalists, in fact, were angered that Madison's proposed Amendments were very different from the
amendments they had called for during the constitutional-ratification debates. Although they supported the protection of individual liberty, above all
the Anti-Federalists desired structural limitations on federal power such as
further limitations on direct taxation or barriers to ratification of treaties, as
evidenced by North Carolina Federalist William Davie's reports to Madison
on his home state's Anti-Federalists: "Instead of a Bill of rights attempting
to enumerate the rights of the Indivi[du]al or the State Governments, they
seem to prefer some general negative confining Congress to the exercise of
the powers particularly granted, with some express negative restriction in
some important cases."293 Madison gave them a very different Bill of Rights.
The recurring image in the debate in Congress was that the Bill of Rights
was a "tub to the whale," an allusion to Jonathan's Swift's Tale of a Tub. In
that story, Swift told how sailors had thrown "an empty tub by way of
amusement" to divert a whale from pursuing their ship. 294 "Madison's contemporaries used the allusion to point out that he had proposed mostly
rights-related amendments rather than ones designed to change the structure

289. James Madison, Notes for Amendments Speech (1789), in 2 DocuMENTARY HISTORY,
supra note 131, at I 042, I 042.
290.

/d. at 1043.

CoNG. REG., supra note 144, at 81. While in certain ways Madison's thought was innovative and perhaps not completely understood by his contemporaries, the concerns he had about
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HARV. L. REV. 611, 625-26 (1999), and it is this concern about majoritarian abuse that Madison's
speech about the Bill of Rights highlights.
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or essence of the new government. The Antifederal leviathan would be diverted and the ship of state could sail away intact."295
During the ratification debate, the Anti-Federalists-the true champions
of a federal system-had been outmaneuvered by the Federalists, who had
seized the politically potent Federalist rubric and reduced their opponents to
defining themselves by their opposition. Something very similar happened
in the battle over the Bill of Rights: Madison shifted the ground under the
Anti-Federalists. Madison proposed a Bill of Rights that was centrally concerned with individual liberties. The Federalists grasped this. "I thank you
for the copy of the amendments proposed to the constitution which you
lately inclosed to me," Joseph Jones, a Virginia Federalist, wrote to Madison
when he received a copy of his proposed Bill of Rights: "[T]hey are calculated to secure the personal rights of the people so far as declarations on
paper can effect the purpose, leaving unimpaired the great Powers of the
government ...."296 William Smith, a congressman from South Carolina,
reviewed the amendments as they emerged from the House committee and
observed "[t]here appears to be a disposition in our house to agree to some,
which will more effectually secure private rights, without affecting the
structure of the Govt." 297 The Anti-Federalists understood as well. "[T]he
Enumeration stops at direct Taxation Treatys Trade," Patrick Henry complained to William Grayson, an Anti-Federalist senator from Virginia. 298
Grayson, in an earlier letter to Henry, had reached the same conclusion:
"[L]ast munday [sic] a string of amendments were presented to the lower
House; these altogether respected personal liberty ... .''299
Perhaps because the Bill of Rights is so principally concerned with individual liberty, scholars have often (although not always) overlooked its
republican elements. 300 Amar's account is a valuable corrective in this regard. But his notions that there is a "grand idea" of the Bill of Rights and
that "popular and populist rights" 301 were at the core of the document obscure much more than they illuminate. Amar seeks a coherence that does not
exist and dramatically overemphasizes the republican aspects of the Bill of
Rights. His textualism leads him astray.
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CONCLUSION

In a classic study of the historian's craft, James West Davidson and
Mark Hamilton Lytle offered a hypothetical account of how the seventeenthcentury explorer John Smith might have described a baseball game between
the New York Yankees and the Boston Red Sox:
[T]hey being assembled about a great field of open grass, a score of their
greatest men ran out upon the field, adorned each in brightly hued jackets
and breeches, with letters cunningly woven upon their Chestes, and wearinge hats uppon their heades, of a sort I know not what. One of their chiefs
stood in the midst and would at his pleasure hurl a white ball at another
chief, whose attire was of a different colour, and whether by chance or artyfice I know not the ball flew exceeding close to the man yet never injured
him, but sometimes he would strike att it with a wooden club and so
giveing it a hard blow would throw down his club and run away. ' 02

The hypothetical account is based on close scrutiny of the game, but it is
completely wrong because the observer "reported events as he saw them" 303
rather than in accordance with the perspective of the participants.
This Article has used Akhil Amar's Bill of Rights, a leading work of the
textualist movement and the product of the movement's leading scholar, as a
case study to illustrate the dramatic gap between a textualist reading of the
Constitution and the way in which the document was originally read.
Amar's account is not unlike the hypothetical Smith's: Smith's description
fails because, while it reflects careful study, it also reflects Smith's perspective, not the perspective of the participants. Amar's account reflects a close
reading of the text, but it fails because it reflects Amar's perspective, not that
of the eighteenth century.
Professor Amar's textualism reflects a series of assumptions: that the
reader can learn about the meaning of constitutional text by looking at the
placement of that text in the document; that words used at different places in
the document should be construed to mean the same thing; and that the
document reflects a one-dimensional, substantively coherent vision. In his
study of the Bill of Rights, Amar draws on these techniques to "offer an integrated overview of the Bill of Rights as originally conceived."304 He
concludes that "the grand idea of the original Bill of Rights" was not the
rights of the individual, but "the rights of the people."305
This Article has sought to show that the interpretation Amar advances of
the Bill of Rights is deeply flawed and that those flaws are in significant part
the product of Amar's textualism: he accords significance to placement
when he should not, he misreads what the founders meant when they repeatedly referred to "the rights" of "the people," and he imposes on the Bill of
302.
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Rights a one-dimensional vision that it did not possess. Amar assumes that
the interpretive premises of his textualism capture the founders' approach to
the Bill of Rights without probing to determine whether this is in fact correct, and this Article has shown that that assumption repeatedly leads to
grave misreadings. It would appear that the Bill of Rights-because it is a
large body of constitutional text produced at one time and in large part written by one person-would represent the best test case for close-reading
textualism. But Amar's application of his interpretive approach to the Bill of
Rights leads to a fundamentally erroneous understanding of individual
clauses and of the document as a whole.
This evidence is of value because it shows that Amar's broadly influential reading of the Bill of Rights as republican is erroneous: his account
dramatically understates how the Bill of Rights protects individual rights.
Moreover, a careful study of Amar's argument illustrates that textualismwith its focus on text and its comparative (or complete) disregard of the
drafting and ratification history that is central to originalism-is illequipped to recover original meaning. The flaws of originalism are well
chronicled. In particular, drafting and ratification history are imperfect
guides to how the document was understood because they may reflect idiosyncratic views of the speakers rather than generally held understandings.
Recognition of these flaws played a critical role in the rise of textualism and
its premise that modem constitutional lawyers should seek to recover original public meaning rather than either the framers' or ratifiers' intent. But the
interpretive tools employed by textualists such as Amar are flawed guides to
original public meaning.
This Article shows the dramatic gap between the Constitution's original
meaning and modem textualist readings. A textualist like Amar reads the
constitutional text in a way that reflects current conceptions rather than a
method informed by carefully studying the evolution of the Constitution
through the process of drafting and by carefully studying what the founding
generation understood the document to mean. Precisely because it minimizes the significance of the historical evidence that originalists rely on to
uncover original intent and original understanding, textualism offers a poor
guide to original public meaning. The textualist search for original public
meaning can succeed only if textualists give the evidence that originalists
highlight-drafting history and ratification history-careful attention and
great weight.

